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Abstract 
This thesis examined the development and application of urban bylaws, in this case the 
City of Delta’s, which regulate properties commonly hosting growing operations or 
laboratories producing and handling federally-listed controlled substances such as 
marijuana. The project was largely exploratory and involved qualitative examination 
public documents such as council meetings, reports, memos and correspondence 
regarding Delta’s Zoning Bylaw and Controlled Substance Property Bylaw—which 
control how land and property are used in the municipality and impose punitive 
sanctions on owners and renters whom infract on these regulations. Prohibitionist 
bylaws such as these can have disruptive consequences on the national legalization of 
marijuana due to these bylaws de facto continuing prohibition on the local level. The 
project uncovered justifications behind the ordinance—both formal and informal—and 
found a legal ecosystem of related municipal ordinances interacting with the (specifically 
those involved with medical marijuana dispensaries and production facilities), potential 
overlaps between bylaws as a result of higher-level changes in law as well as legal and 
economic consequences—such as creating favourable conditions for large 
agribusiness.  
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Introduction/Background 
I had not heard the word “grow-op” until I was in Grade 7 when a Delta Police 
constable came to our class to give a drug safety talk to the students followed by a brief 
show-and-tell of her patrol cruiser. My classmates (unlike me) were familiar with the 
word since they had not spent the past five years (1999-2004) abroad as a Canadian 
expat in American Samoa and Trinidad. The constable informed us of the physical and 
mental harms caused by illicit drugs, noting that marijuana was the least harmful and 
addictive of the group. My interest in this topic was dormant until an undergraduate 
class on late Imperial China led to the subject of the Opium Wars. Our instructor made 
connections between the arguments and debate over opium liberalization and current 
discussions of marijuana legalization. This lecture motivated me to change the focus of 
my degree from General Studies to Criminology and sparked an interest in drug laws 
around marijuana or cannabis.   
In this paper, I build on my initial (and general interest) in the regulation of 
marijuana and will critically investigate the development, objectives and application of 
cannabis-related municipal bylaws in Delta. This research will provide an understanding 
of the process behind the creation and enforcement of bylaws regulating land-uses and 
businesses that sell, handle or otherwise deal with controlled substances and 
chemicals. Since there is little research on this topic, my study fills a gap in the research 
on marijuana regulation in Lower Mainland municipalities. My focus on municipal bylaws 
led me to examine the specific bylaws that addressed activities related to marijuana and 
city documents and papers that discussed these bylaws, their effectiveness and 
context. Meanwhile, I paid close attention the content of my research to see if there 
were aspects of (latent/implicit) ideological influences on municipal bylaws that are not 
explicitly stated by the official wording of them. I maintained a critical view of municipal 
bylaws with the view that ideological influences might also coincide with potential 
economic and class-based characteristics in bylaws and questioned the role that they 
play in the “War on Drugs”. Overall in this paper I argue that municipal bylaws play an 
important, though less noticeable, role in the War on Drugs1. 
Delta is a suburban municipality located south of the Fraser River, west of the 
City of Surrey and north of Whatcom County (Point Roberts) in the US State of 
Washington. It is the southwestern edge of the Greater Vancouver metropolitan area. 
Delta is comprised of three main urban centres/communities: Tsawwassen (furthest 
south; next to the US-Canada border), Ladner (in the center; next to the Fraser River) 
and North Delta (furthest north and east; next to Surrey). Besides being suburban, 
nearly half of Delta is agricultural land while one fifth is occupied by the Burns Bog. The 
city lies in the intersection of the region’s main transportation infrastructure (Corporation 
of Delta, Official Community Plan, 1-6). The city’s official name until recently was the 
                                                          
1 “War on Drugs” refers to the current global effort, started and led by the United States, to criminalize 
narcotic substances and their use that began in the latter half of the 20th century (Lopez, 2016). Canada is 
a participant in this effort in part due to how much the US has an influence over Canada—such as in 
trade policy (Major & Kapelos, 2018). The term “prohibition” means that, by law, a material product is 
forbidden from being produced, exchanged or consumed with the goal of eliminating the product itself or 
the practices around it (Thornton, 1991, 71-73). 
2Corporation of Delta rather than “City of Delta”. This is a frequent source of frustration 
for city officials and confusion to outside parties—as was noted by civic delegations sent 
to Rotterdam, Netherlands and to Canada’s federal capital Ottawa. Since 2017, Delta’s 
local government has undergone the process of formally changing its name to “City of 
Delta” (Gyarmati, 2017) which was finalized on September 22nd, 2017 by order of British 
Columbia’s Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General and the Minister of Municipal Affairs 
and Housing (Order in Council No. 362).  
Delta is a culturally diverse municipality but there are certainly areas of it that are 
more homogenous (European, Asian, conservative, bohemian, etc.) than the rest. 
Indeed, although Delta’s bylaws are not overtly or intentionally designed with racial or 
class categorization in mind, it is certainly the case that they may impact certain ethnic 
populations more than others and that fines and penalties imposed on properties would 
impact homeowners and tenants of certain income levels.3 Delta is located on the 
traditional sovereign territories of the Tsawwassen First Nation—a Coast Salish people 
whom are the original inhabitants of the area and exercise local jurisdiction on the 
coastline southwest of the settler suburbs of Tsawwassen (Tsawwassen First Nation, 
2016). The Musqueam First Nation are also present on a small patch of land west of 
Ladner (Musqueam Indian Band, 2011). The municipality as a political entity was 
incorporated in 1879 with Ladner as its administrative centre (Corporation of Delta, 
About Delta, 2017) and the authority of Delta and its Official Community Plan ultimately 
derives from the Province of British Columbia’s Local Government Act (Corporation of 
Delta, Official Community Plan, 1-3). In addition to changes in BC politics and marijuana 
laws, Delta’s current political focus revolves around issues of housing prices, the 
George Massey Tunnel and wastewater treatment plant and casino proposals.  
By presenting an argument that situates municipal bylaws within in the broader 
and ideological framing of the War on Drugs, I suggest that municipal bylaws in Delta 
further the harmful policy regime of prohibition. Further, I argue that bylaws—particularly 
those regulating activities related to marijuana production and use—are developed 
based upon ideological factors or reactionary thinking (such as militant Drug 
War/Prohibitionist orthodoxy/rhetoric) rather than objective considerations of fact or 
reason. My research revolved around questions relating to how the bylaws were 
developed and applied, with a key interest in potential consequences. Particularly, I 
looked for evidence of ideological influences on policy and what sort of effects or 
applications would the bylaw have in a class dimension. 
As such, I have organized this paper in the following order. First I elaborate on 
the context of drug regulation/policy on a local, region, national and international-level. I 
then review the academic scholarship on drug policy and municipal bylaws followed by 
a discussion of this project’s research methods. Third, I present the key findings of this 
study by highlighting particular themes in the data. After presenting the initial findings, I 
present an analysis and discussion of the potential implication this research might have 
                                                          
2 In this paper, the use of Delta’s former official name will be minimized except where necessitated in the 
in-text citations and bibliography. For the remainder if this paper I will refer to Delta as simply ‘Delta’.  
3 In Operation “Bud-Out” the pool of suspects arrested for marijuana growing operations were 
overwhelmingly of Vietnamese heritage (Bellett, May 15, 2000, p. B1/Front). 
on future research and understandings of municipal bylaws and implementing drug-
oriented policies on the local level.  
 Drug Regulation in Context (Local-Regional-National-International) 
There had been a growing concern about marijuana grow operations in the 
Lower Mainland in the early 2000s. British Columbia had seen the highest rate of drug-
related offences and incidents in Canada. The City of Surrey had seen the rate of 247 
incidents per 100,000 people in 1998 rise to 531 per 100,000 in 2002 while Vancouver 
saw, in the same period, a rise from 356 to 545 and Richmond 403 to 651 (Toronto, 
Canada’s largest city4, saw a comparatively measly rise of 172 to 211). Many of these 
incidents involved marijuana (Fraser, March 19, 2004, p. A4). Police, in the early 2000s, 
estimated approximately 10,000 marijuana grow operations existed in BC and various 
initiatives were being looked at to respond to this growing issue. A few remedies 
proposed by police included registering landlords and their rental properties; bylaws 
ensuring that shops selling hydroponic equipment register their sales (including 
pawnshops); bylaws forcing landlords or their representatives to do certain checks on 
their property and renters; and asking city councils to refuse new licences for 
businesses selling hydroponics equipment (Dawson, April 16, 2000, p. A12).  
During the early 2000s, other municipalities in the Lower Mainland of BC, namely 
Port Moody (with their Controlled Substance Property Bylaw (No. 2523)) and Surrey 
(with their Community Improvement & Controlled Substance Manufacture Bylaw (No. 
14422)) (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, August 7, 2003), had enacted local 
government bylaws that would charge property owners for the costs of building safety 
inspections, removal and disposal of narcotics and drug equipment (which included both 
marijuana grow-ops and methamphetamine labs), search warrants and police overtime 
that a city would normally have to pay the bills on (Delta Optimist, February 11, 2004, p. 
3). In January 2003, a landlord in the Whalley area of Surrey announced the sale of 
their house following multiple raids by RCMP on the property leading to the discovery of 
amounts of crack cocaine (Spencer, January 24, 2003, p. A7). In June that same year, 
a residential property in Surrey became the first in BC to be forfeited to the Crown under 
new Federal forfeiture laws (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, August 7, 2003). 
Municipalities clearly felt an urgency in regulating the situation of marijuana regulation. 
In 2004, Delta passed a local statute called the Controlled Substance Property 
Bylaw (acting under definitions of the federal Controlled Drugs and Substances Act) 
(CSPB, 2004, 2) which includes the following prohibition: “No person, owner or 
occupant of property shall cause, permit or allow any property to become or remain a 
place for the manufacture, trade, use, sharing, sale or barter of a controlled substance” 
(CSPB, 2004, 3). The bylaw included provisions allowing for municipal enforcement 
inspection, cutting off of utilities and monetary penalties (CSPB, 2004, 3-6). This bylaw 
created in 2004 clearly was meant to control and prevent the incidence of marijuana 
grow-ops in Delta residential neighbourhoods.  
                                                          
4 Over 6.2 million people in 2016 according to Statistics Canada: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-
tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo05a-eng.htm 
In 2016, the newly opened WeeMedical Dispensary in North Delta had its 
business license application rejected by the Corporation of Delta on the grounds that it 
contravened the city’s bylaws. In this case, the WeeMedical Dispensary violated 
provisions of the Delta Zoning Bylaw that prohibited land-use for the production and 
retail sale of medicinal cannabis within the boundaries of the municipality (Kupchuk, 
2016). Councillor Bruce McDonald emphasized that the decision by Delta Council was 
not about the medicinal qualities of marijuana itself—he stated: “We’re not here to talk 
about marijuana as good, bad, or indifferent. We’re talking about a business” (Kupchuk, 
2016). However, it was clear that the Corporation wanted to be tough on drugs. 
 Despite this opposition from the city, WeeMedical continued to operate until it 
was ordered closed by the British Columbia Supreme Court. However, it reopened 
again under a different legal name, and the battle is still in the courts (Dimoff, 2016). 
During this legal battle in Delta, cannabis continues to be a major, multi-billion dollar 
industry in British Columbia’s economy with significant potential tax revenue for cities 
looking to reinvest in infrastructure. Before being overshadowed by other societal 
concerns, cannabis regulation had initially been predicted to become an issue in BC’s 
May 2017 provincial election (Bell, 2016). 
The debate over marijuana prohibition occurs in a time of public fear and concern 
in Delta and the Lower Mainland of BC over the health risks posed to drug users—
particularly the risk of death by the synthetic opioid known as fentanyl. In Delta nine 
people overdosed from fentanyl within 20 minutes of each other when they took what 
they believed was untainted cocaine (Jacques, 2016). Only the day before had the 
Vancouver Coastal Health Authority released data they had collected from the 
supervised injection site Insite which revealed that a vast majority of street drugs 
contained this highly dangerous opioid (Canadian Press, 2016).  
In this fentanyl crisis, Delta (in coordination with Delta Police, Delta School 
District, Fraser Health and others) was prompted to host a series of public forums (one 
of which I attended) to discuss with and inform the public of the crisis (Cloverdale 
Reporter, 2016). At the forum, Delta Police made the interesting clarification that 
fentanyl posed more of a risk to drug users consuming heroin, oxycodone and cocaine 
and not so much for those using marijuana5 (Vaughan-Smith, 2016. 4-5).  
The local context of marijuana regulation in Delta occurs at an interesting 
moment in national and international approaches to drug policy and regulation. In the 
United States, we have seen the increasing visibility of conservative and far-right politics 
with the 2016 election of Donald Trump. While major US news media outlets focused on 
the results of the presidency (and a little on the Senate and House races), other 
important changes occurred on November 8th, 2016 that went underreported. In several 
states, voters passed ballot measures that legalized marijuana recreationally while 
several more (mostly land-locked) states’ voters passed ballot measures legalizing 
marijuana medically (Levin, 2016). This, however presents a conflict of both laws and 
the opinions of government officials as marijuana may be legal on the state-level but not 
                                                          
5 The risk has more to do with cross-contamination due to poor quality control and not necessarily 
because of intentional use in the cannabis (Vaughan-Smith, 2016. 4-5). 
the federal-level (Joachim, 2014). Developments in the US are influential on this project 
as they reflect overall cultural changes in attitude towards marijuana that are 
manifesting themselves in official local government reforms—reforms that may influence 
decisions by local governments in Canada (some of whom are literally adjacent to US 
districts that have legalized recreational cannabis)6 to accommodate this change or 
resist it entirely. For municipalities in the Lower Mainland, this type of reform or reaction 
manifests itself in the form of bylaws and land-use regulations. 
In April 2017, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced new legislation changing 
the legal status of marijuana (legalization) that would originally have become law on 
July 1, 2018 (Cochrane, 2017). However, the date was delayed and changed to October 
17, 2018 after the Liberal government decided to allow the provinces more time to 
prepare for the coming legalization despite their previous promises of a summer 
deadline (although the Prime Minister was also under pressure for a full-year delay in 
legalization) (Courtenay, 2018). Cannabis legalization fulfilled the promise made by 
Trudeau’s Liberal Party during Canada’s 2015 federal election in which Trudeau had 
promised to remove the prohibition of marijuana consumption from the Criminal Code 
and design a regulatory regime for legalized sale and distribution (Real Change, 2015, 
55).7 Recreational cannabis did finally become legal across Canada on October 17th, 
2018, but there are still numerous concerns and questions remaining about how 
legalization will be implemented—particularly regarding how cannabis can be sold 
commercially in the provinces (Butler, 2018). 
The Liberals’ legalization scheme has faced criticism from long-time cannabis 
advocate (the so-called “Prince of Pot”) Marc Emery who has labelled it as “not a real 
legalization” due to the myriad number of rules and regulations that will continue to 
criminalize people for even minor or unintentional infractions (notably, one’s own 
residence might not necessarily be a legal place to smoke). Emery has also called the 
legalization dysfunctional because, although October 17th is the date recreational 
cannabis became legal, it will not be available in for authorized government retail sale in 
most provinces (which Emery criticizes for making the product too expensive) until 6-7 
months after that date—during which, raids and arrests will continue to be conducted 
against private, unauthorized sellers. A more ominous concern Emery raises (which, 
incidentally will come up again later in this paper) is the preferential treatment of 
cannabis production by large corporations and agribusiness (Coulter, 2018).  
Likewise, concerns over the handling of criminal pardons for those previously 
convicted of simple marijuana possession have also been raised. The Liberal 
                                                          
6 Recreational Cannabis was legalized in Washington State in 2014 by voters in State Initiative 502. Delta 
physically borders the State’s exclave of Point Roberts and is only a few kilometres from the rest of 
Washington. 
7 Curiously, despite the claims made by the Liberal Party platform, marijuana possession was actually 
listed under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) and not the Criminal Code itself. 
Nevertheless, under the CDSA, anyone found in possession of Cannabis “is guilty of an indictable offence 
and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years less a day” (CDSA, S4(4a)) and that is just 
one punishment for one type of drug possessed in one way it is possessed (there are many more 
variations).  
 
government have proposed to waive the $631 fee and 5-10 year waiting period to apply 
for a pardon and record suspension for those charged with marijuana possession. 
Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale claims that the move will “shed the burden and 
stigma” and break down the barriers such convictions put for employment, housing, 
education or volunteering. However, the minister has so far not presented a timeframe 
for such pardons and the proposal has also faced further criticism in the House of 
Commons from the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP). NDP Justice critic Murray 
Rankin has called for complete expungement of such criminal records because simply 
suspending them (as Minister Goodale has proposed) does not actually remove the 
barriers people face for travel, housing or volunteer work. Specifically, people would still 
be required to answer “yes” on any form that asks if they have (even suspended) 
criminal convictions—thereby perpetuating punishment for a crime that is no longer one. 
The Liberal government, of course, would have precedent for expunging these records 
since, earlier in 2018, they tabled legislation that would expunge the records for those 
previously convicted of activities (buggery, etc.) that were aimed at criminalizing 
homosexuality. Although the Liberal government has claimed that marijuana conviction 
does not meet the criteria of “profound historical injustice” that homosexual convictions 
face, this rationale has been challenged by NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh because of the 
close relationship cannabis convictions have with discrimination against racialized 
communities, Indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups whom would still suffer 
without full record expungement (Harris, 2018). Undoubtedly, Canada’s post-
legalization drug policy is certainly going to be a confusing and difficult chapter. 
However, pre-legalization, Canadian drug policy had some exceptions 
particularly with regards to safe-injections sites like INSITE (Fafard, 2012, 906) and for 
medical use of cannabis in accordance with the Access to Cannabis for Medical 
Purposes Regulations (Health Canada). The legal exemption of using cannabis for 
medicinal purposes has had an impact on the municipal government-level. The City of 
Vancouver’s existing zoning regulations regarding the growing number of medical 
marijuana dispensaries arose out of a lack of a clear or transparent regulatory 
framework from the Canadian federal government. As such, Vancouver had to adopt 
regulations that were partially (and explicitly) based on the regulatory frameworks of the 
US states of Washington and Colorado (specifically with regards to appropriate 
distances between marijuana dispensaries and other types of property) (Vancouver, 
2015). The legalization of marijuana will present questions for cities regarding how they 
should respond or regulate commercial activities on marijuana products that are used 
recreationally. 
Like in the end of alcohol prohibition, local area governments still have the 
authority to enact measures of control (such as bylaws) around such products and 
activities associated with them (Locke, 2013). Prior to legalization, some BC 
municipalities already had bylaws on the books that regulate properties and businesses 
that deal with controlled substances like marijuana (Corporation of Delta, Council 
Report, August 7, 2003). There is comparatively little academic work on this subject as 
opposed to the criminal law aspects of drug liberalization. Thus, it is useful and timely 
explore how cities regulate controlled substances and how they decided upon the 
bylaws they enacted. 
When discussing the regulation of drugs, it is important to acknowledge and 
address the meaning behind the “War on Drugs.” The “War on Drugs” is a term first 
used by US President Richard Nixon to describe the global, militarized effort to enforce 
strict prohibition against the production, transportation and consumption of certain 
narcotics and psychoactive substances—with a focus, ideally, on the production and 
transportation side of the issue (Lopez, 2016). Domestically, the “War on Drugs” calls 
for national governments to provide increasing assistance (this can include funding 
expenditures, equipment and more flexible laws) to local and regional police to intensify 
enforcement efforts (police departments in the US are incentivised to enforce prohibition 
under threat of losing funding). Internationally, national governments (notably the US 
government) provide aid to the governments of other countries in enforcing prohibitionist 
policies there—particularly military assistance to Latin American countries like Colombia 
where drug trafficking has allowed organized crime to establish their own armed forces 
or militias (Lopez, 2016). The “War on Drugs”, however, has had very problematic 
results. These include (but are not limited to) drug production expanding to other 
regions (rather than being reduced), disproportionate application of the law on 
communities of colour and leading to sharp increases in violence by organized crime (in 
some countries, this has led to major refugee crises) (Lopez, 2016). From a simple 
series of national efforts, drug prohibition is now manifested as a world-wide system 
held up by international treaties (overseen by the United Nations’ International Narcotics 
Control Board) in which every country on Earth is a signatory or is in legal compliance 
with one or more of said treaties (Levine, 2003, 145). Modern national (US) drug 
prohibition’s origins lay in the 1920s when the main focus for the US government was 
stamping out alcohol (Levine, 2003, 146).  
However, national and multinational prohibition efforts against drugs and alcohol 
have existed in North America and Asia for centuries, primarily against opium. The 
Chinese Empire (Qing Dynasty) had enacted numerous bans on recreational opium 
throughout the 19th century in response to massive rates of addiction. Like what 
happened later in the 20th century, this led to the rise of organized crime (notably by 
members of the Triad Society), smuggling operations and familiar public debates led by 
legalization advocates (Rowe, 2009, 166-167). Eventually, concerns over opium-use 
grew in the West, leading to a proliferation of local bans on opium smoking (such in San 
Francisco in 1875) and eventually national regulatory regimes such as the 1914 
Harrison Narcotics Act in the US (Windle, 2013, 1187-1188) and various statutes in 
1920s Britain that had resulted from the 1926 Rolleston Committee Report on opium 
addiction and pharmacy control (Bennett, 1988, 301-302). In Canada, drug laws and 
drug “scares” had their origins in period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and 
were influenced by colonialism and racism (where regulation of First Nations people and 
Chinese immigrants was the focus) as well as from temperance and anti-opiate 
movements in society. Substance use regulation began as early as 1886 when 
amendments to the Indian Act established prohibitions against buying or possessing 
alcohol for First Nations people (which did not prevent them from doing so and led to 
otherwise unnecessary arrests and imprisonment) (Boyd & Carter, 2014, 43).  
The arrival of Chinese migrants8 led to the next phase of drug control: opium. 
Institutional anti-Asian sentiments of the white settlers coincided with mass fears of 
opium smoking spreading to white populations as well as racist fears of white women 
being victimized by “evil” Chinese men (Boyd & Carter, 2014, 45). These sentiments, 
fomented by media, labour, police and local politicians, eventually led to civil disorder 
such as Vancouver race riots of 1887 and 1907. Future Prime Minister Mackenzie King, 
visiting BC to the settle damage claims of Chinese and Japanese residents caused by 
the 1907 riot, was contacted by the Anti-Opium League. King considered investigating 
prohibitionist policies—the hope was “to get some good out of this riot” (Boyd & Carter, 
2014, 45).  
Mackenzie King’s report on riot compensation was accompanied by another: The 
Need for Suppression of the Opium Traffic in Canada—which outlined some of the 
physical and moral (emphasizing Canada’s responsibility as a “Christian” nation) harms 
of opium smoking and recommended outlawing sales, production and imports of opium 
in order to protect the citizenry. King’s recommendation resulted in the Opium Act of 
1908—notable for its passing with little parliamentary debate or pharmacological 
evidence or testimony to support it. It was also racially biased. The Act regulated 
smoke-able opium—an activity linked mostly to Chinese men—but not so much the 
elixirs and patent medicines associated with white settlers (Boyd & Carter, 2014, 45).  
However, it was not until 1923 that cannabis was criminalized in Canada (like the 
Opium Act, it was done without debate). However, at the time, cannabis was not yet a 
popular drug in either Canada or the US (Boyd & Carter, 2014, 51). The demonization 
of cannabis use outside of the moral reformer discourse emerged in the 1930s. During 
the Great Depression there was a time of an increased influx of Mexican labourers—
whom were unfairly demonized in the press for being associated with the introduction of 
marijuana-use amongst Americans and Canadians (Boyd & Carter, 2014, 52-53). Moral 
reformers and the media in the US and Canada identified marijuana use as threatening 
the middle-class society and youth (which conveniently was also experiencing 
demographic shifts from Hispanic North Americans). As such, it was the 1930s that saw 
increased efforts by law enforcement in both the US and Canada (at times these efforts 
were in direct coordination as was the case with the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
and the RCMP’s Narcotics Division operationally and policy-wise) (Boyd & Carter, 2014, 
52-53). The years leading up to the 1960s saw an increase in the popularity of 
cannabis-use alongside increasingly sensationalist media reporting on the dangers of 
the drug. Indeed, prior to 1961, arrests for marijuana possession in Canada were 
considerably rare: no arrests were made until 1937 (which saw 4) and would remain 
stable in number until 1958 (14 people) and then more in 1960 (21 people) (Boyd & 
Carter, 2014, 55).  
In 1961, Canada enacted, under pressure from law enforcement officials, the 
Narcotic Control Act which became notable for being one of the harshest drug laws of 
                                                          
8 First began during the 1858 gold rush in British Columbia but contributed to also by the construction of 
the Canadian Pacific Railway post-1867 (Belshaw, 2016, 274, 251); Japanese immigration began around 
the 1890s (Belshaw, 2016, 254); immigration from South Asia began roughly around the 1910s (Belshaw, 
2016, 256). 
any Western country9. As the 1960s progressed, cannabis-use increased in popularity 
and became associated with the growing counterculture movement—combined with 
increasingly harsher laws, this resulted in a substantial increase in arrests in both the 
United States and Canada; coincidentally accompanied by increased media hysteria 
around the drug in both countries (Boyd & Carter, 2014, 55-57). Changing attitudes and 
concerns around marijuana-use during the late 1960s to the late 1970s would see a 
temporary relaxation of anti-drug laws. In 1969, Canada gave its judges more discretion 
in their ability to impose lesser penalties for simple marijuana possession (but offences 
relating to trafficking would continue to be harshly punished) (Boyd & Carter, 2014, 58-
59).10 National cannabis prohibition and cannabis regulations enforcement in Canada 
have continued to evolve as such to the present day—but hardly in a situation free of 
international influences. 
Not unlike modern multinational efforts, this emerging trend of domestic 
prohibition coincided with the US government lending support for China’s opium ban 
and imposing similar bans on the Philippines (then a US colony) (Windle, 2013, 1187). 
A formal multinational effort to prohibit opium use began as early as 1909 at the 
Shanghai Opium Conference which was led and pushed for by the United States and 
included 13 other countries. Canada’s Mackenzie King was in attendance and had 
established himself and Canada as pioneers in drug control (given his 1908 Opium Act). 
Most notably, King was quoted as saying that US delegations to the Conference had 
admitted to copying Canadian legislation in drafting drug suppression statutes. The 
Shanghai Conference laid the foundations for the 1912 (first) International Opium 
Conference in The Hague where the first international drug control treaty—the 
International Opium Convention—was signed by participating countries. Despite the 
Canadian legislative influence, leadership in opium control would be a predominantly 
American effort (applied largely to East and South Asian nations) (Boyd & Carter, 2014, 
46-47). 
Since the early 1980s there has been an increasingly militarized response to 
drug production and use, particularly in the United States (indeed, President Ronald 
Reagan made curtailing drugs a “national security” issue) (Bagley, 1988, 189). In this 
aggressive, modern policy regime, if a government sought to address drug consumption 
they have little room for any other response since, like the 18th Amendment and 
Volstead Act limited US states’ responses to alcohol, the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs similarly restricts reform attempts by national governments (breaching or 
withdrawing from this treaty opens countries to severe sanctions) (Levine, 2003, 150).  
The role of bylaws and municipalities play in prohibitions influenced by the War 
on Drugs has not been studied to the same extent as researchers have done for federal 
and state/provincial/territorial governments, police, schools or health authorities. Nor 
has there been much study of the reasoning processes behind the enactment and 
                                                          
9 The Act reinforced the (socially-constructed) notion that use, users, producers and sellers of drugs was 
naturally criminogenic; that same year, Canada signed onto the International Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs (Boyd & Carter, 2014, 56). 
10 The United States, in contrast, would see a period during 1973-1978 of decriminalization on the state-
level only to revert back to criminalizing marijuana possession as public opinion began to shift again at 
the end of the 1970s (Nadelmann, 1998, 122). 
enforcement of such bylaws. As such, Delta is an interesting place to study in that its 
municipal Council have been active in passing bylaws and fighting court cases that are 
clearly directed at addressing marijuana-related activities. Delta’s location in Metro 
Vancouver and its proximity to Washington State (regions known for liberal attitudes 
towards cannabis; Washington legalized it recreationally in 2014) make studying this 
municipality’s political activities even more intriguing. In order to situate my case study 
in the broader context of drug regulation, I will first discuss literature related to local 
government and narcotics regulation.  
Literature Review 
Critique of local laws and the War on Drugs: 
For this paper, I have drawn from socio-legal studies, political and health 
sciences literature to examine the broad range of studies and documents in the area of 
drug policy and regulation. In this section, I will first examine the literature relating to the 
critique of legal mechanisms and local/municipal regulation. In the second section, I will 
approach laws from a class-based and intersectional perspective. In the third section, I 
frame local laws within critical discussion of the discourse of the War on Drugs. 
It is imperative to first define bylaws and examine how they operate. Valverde, a 
leading scholar on municipal law, acknowledges that municipal laws govern, land and 
its uses or activities—not necessarily or directly the people on it (Valverde, 2005, 35). 
Municipal statutes regulate a space’s access, control, “enjoyment of” by people, its 
division and its material contents like buildings and structures (Valverde, 2005, 36). 
Interference with any of these spatial characteristics (such as the “enjoyment”) 
unreasonably can be considered “nuisances” and subject to legal consequences 
(Johns, 2005, 65). Under this system, for example, towns can forbid activities such as 
smoking too close to open windows or skateboarding in a shopping centre. Localities 
also use bylaws to regulate what has been termed locally unwanted land uses (Németh 
and Ross, 2014, 6). Indeed, much of the literature on local law is critical of certain local 
government uses of bylaws and some draw influence from critical or structural theories 
(Valverde, 2005, 35).  
Local Legal Mechanisms & Division of Powers in Canada 
The function and effect of local laws11 and the legal structures behind them have 
been criticized by several socio-legal scholars. Notably, the legal structure that bylaws 
operate under is inherently flawed with limited powers granted to local bylaws that 
forces governments to operate in a manner that appears to be oppressive on one hand 
or ineffective on the other. Scholars focus on the structure and vulnerabilities of local 
laws. Laws may be big and oppressive, but that is due to inherent flaws in the legal 
system itself. These flaws, in turn, affect the power of local laws and regulations to carry 
out their objectives. Canada’s federalist Constitution grants and divides certain 
sovereign powers to the Federal and Provincial governments (Constitution Acts, S. 91-
95). Municipal, local or city levels of government lack these powers and are legally 
subordinate to the Provincial and Federal governments—thus limiting their legal means 
and authority to effectively address social problems or matters of social justice. Zoning 
                                                          
11 Bylaws/ordinances/regulations created by municipal governments. 
and land-use regulations are thus the only tools that many local governments have to 
respond to social issues (Ranasinghe and Valverde, 2006, 327). Additionally, 
international laws and treaties, like the aforementioned United Nations 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, restrict reform attempts by national governments 
(Levine, 2003, 150). 
Given the restrictive legal hierarchy that municipalities must operate in, 
municipalities are limited in their choice of actions. Actions which, consequently, can be 
interpreted as oppressive towards lower-income and/or marginalized groups of people. 
In Allard v. Canada, the Court noted issues with municipal bylaws in addition to the 
Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations’ unconstitutionality (where plaintiffs’ 
Section 7 Charter rights involving the right to life, liberty and security of the person were 
violated). Particularly, the judge noted that bylaw compliance inspections presented 
privacy issues for medical marijuana patients (Allard v. Canada, 2016). Essentially, as 
this case demonstrated, the lawful and dutiful enforcement of local government 
ordinance compliance can lead to violations of civil liberties of vulnerable groups.  
 Likewise, municipal processes attempting reform the system have similar 
structural flaws. Although local governments technically are open to public input on 
decision-making, not everyone is able to effectively utilize their rights or properly 
advocate for themselves. For example, municipal land-use laws are directly tied to 
ownership of property and the rights of landowners. As such, landless persons like the 
homeless cannot argue for or make claims on their shelters based on rights. At the 
same time, public consultations themselves operate under the presupposed assumption 
that all concerned parties to an issue are equal in status and stature (Ranasinghe and 
Valverde, 2006, 329). Effectively, the “right” to the city’s space and land is only a right 
for some, not everyone (Mitchell, 2003, 189). Scholars like Mitchell views local laws, 
particularly in the present context, as a means (although not explicitly) for privileged 
groups in society—whom are tied to the new globalized, “symbolic” economy which 
values aesthetics—to rearrange and redefine public spaces as being only for those 
whom own property and that this arrangement is the natural order of things (Mitchell, 
2003, 190-191). 
Other researchers (Ranasinghe & Valverde, 2006; Németh & Ross, 2014) point 
to the system’s flaws at procedural level.  A frequent criticism is that municipal law 
processes get bogged down in delays and complexity that can stall attempts reform 
statutes and policies for years—as was seen in the City of Toronto’s homeless shelter 
initiative in the early 2000s (Ranasinghe and Valverde, 2006, 339). At times, delays in 
the municipal process can be the impact of the phenomenon of NIMBYism (which will 
be discussed later in this paper). 
Lastly, a systemic issue identified in the literature is that many local and regional 
policy processes are led from the top-down. Some government bodies charged with 
addressing an issue do so with little contribution from planning staff—whom may be 
more aware of socio-economic issues relevant to a case (Németh and Ross, 2014, 17). 
As a hypothetical example of this trend, a governing mayor and city council is in power 
that is staunchly against supporting a homeless shelter because they believe is 
discourages the homeless from working. Planning staff, consisting of urban policy and 
homelessness experts, advises supporting the shelter because there is evidence of it 
helping the homeless stay employed. Despite the evidence, the mayor and council 
move against the shelter because, at the end, it is their choice whether to follow the 
advice of their subordinates. It is not unreasonable to conclude that the legal 
mechanisms and structures that local governments operate under are prone to issues 
that might hamper efforts to either carry out its mandate or reform itself. Even if a mayor 
and city council were elected on a Marijuana Party slate, the Canadian legal structure 
would restrict them from legalizing or decriminalizing cannabis. In fact, they may 
(inadvertently) be forced to take actions supporting War on Drugs efforts. 
Class Conflict & Local Laws 
Bylaws and local regulations have been highlighted in the literature as 
manifestations of class and cultural conflicts, and can be understood as oppressive. 
Indeed, much of the literature on municipalities and local governance focus on issues 
relating to class-based conflict (particularly low-income populations and racial and 
ethnic minorities). In particular, bylaws have been shown to be instruments of 
(racialized) class-based oppression negatively affecting low-income populations. 
Additionally, bylaws have also come to represent cultural battlegrounds over meaning 
(for instance, ideas of property rights between First Nations cultures, settler Anglo-
Canadian culture and recently immigrated Asian cultures). This section is divided into 
two subsections that focuses on local laws: as contributing to or manifesting as 
oppression and that as a battleground over meaning.  
Local laws as oppressive 
Local statutes negatively effecting the homeless are a frequent example cited by 
scholars in this field. Cities that enact local ordinances aimed at governing “disorder” in 
the urban landscape—often with a crime-reduction strategy in mind—all too often do so 
while ignoring underlying social issues (such as lack of affordable housing which is a 
source of, for example, the presence of homeless people in public spaces) (England, 
2008, 3). 
Other scholars identify local statutes as functioning to perpetuate oppression 
based on race and ethnicity. Bylaws in Seattle, notably SODA (“Stay Out of Drug 
Areas”) were found to have excessively targeted African Americans as potential drug 
trafficking suspects. The statute permitted police to remove from certain areas people 
whom seemed “out of place”—given that so few African Americans live in Seattle at all 
automatically makes them appear “out of place” in their area (the American Civil 
Liberties Union released statistics showing that three-quarters of SODA arrests were 
African-Americans) (England, 2008, 207).  
Likewise, SOPA’s (“Stay Out of Prostitution Areas”) effect on sex workers was 
pushing them further into hiding—increasing their vulnerability to predatory violence 
(Herbert and Beckett, 2009, 18-19). The prohibition of people from public areas has 
ironically led them to be prohibited from the very sites where social services (such as 
bathrooms, meals and clothing donations) to assist them are located (Herbert and 
Beckett, 2009, 19). How and whom enforces local statutes, of course, varies. In the 
case of Seattle and its SODA ordinance, certain areas of the city were made to be off-
limits to or restricted from being patronized by people with past drug convictions. Heavy 
police presence and surveillance in these areas allow known persons breaking this 
order to be arrested by police (England, 2008, 202). Some of these arrests can be 
further justified as enforcing compliance of these individuals to their probation or parole 
duties (Herbert and Beckett, 2009, 2). 
A significant amount of the literature on local law and class/culture oppression 
has been based on qualitative methods like interviews and storytelling (Mitchel, 2003; 
England, 2008). However, researchers using quantitative methods have arrived at 
similar conclusions to their qualitatively-focused colleagues. In Denver, for example, 
studies were conducted on how and where local authorities chose to permit businesses 
described as LULUs or “locally unwanted land uses” (Németh and Ross, 2014, 6). The 
authors highlighted that an overwhelming concentration of LULUs were in two major 
areas identified by census tracts as being less affluent or socio-economically 
disadvantaged—particularly those with high proportions of Black, Hispanic, Asian and 
Native residents (Németh and Ross, 2014, 6). The Denver example demonstrates 
evidence of racial and cultural oppression. 
Furthermore, residential property owners exercise influence over decision-
making regarding land-use and relevant statutes (Ranasinghe and Valverde, 2006, 
328). The phenomenon of NIMBY or “not in my back yard” (Németh and Ross, 2014, 7) 
is a good example of the power of homeowners in municipal politics. City authorities in 
Seattle were tasked to decide on the location of social services agencies working 
tandem with their punitive policing measures and needed to keep in mind and avoid the 
rampant NIMBYism in their jurisdiction (England, 2008, 209). Similarly, a 2002 Toronto 
homeless shelter initiative involved NIMBYism. Then city councillor Jack Layton 
identified certain community groups, especially more affluent citizens with NIMBY 
sentiments, that subverted the needs of Toronto’s homeless population (Ranasinghe 
and Valverde, 2006, 338). This mobilization was founded upon fear and anger: fear that 
the homeless would cause neighbourhood disorder and anger that—allegedly—the City 
of Toronto’s review process for the shelter was made without consultation (Ranasinghe 
and Valverde, 2006, 337).  
For the most part, land-use laws function to protect property values and minimize 
the impact that “undesirable” land-uses have on property values (Ranasinghe and 
Valverde, 2006, 327). Local laws and regulations have ideological underpinnings to 
them and are meant to displace scrutiny and blame for underlying social problems 
(Mitchell, 2003, 178). Often, the ideology that is cited as the foundation for modern-day 
oppressive measures is neoliberalism—a right-wing reaction to socially progressive 
movements and policies formed in the 1960s (Mitchell, 2003, 164). It is not 
unreasonable to think that a prohibitionist/War on Drugs ideology would influence the 
development of local land-use regulations to further its cause (future researchers might 
be well-advised to explore these links further). 
Municipal bylaws and disputes over meaning 
Scholars like Nicholas Blomley focus less on municipal legislation themselves 
and more so on the underlying ideas—particularly of property and boundaries—that 
municipal laws tend to govern. He identified differences in how one treats property 
between cultures, based on a study in a Vancouver neighbourhood. Asian respondents 
appeared to have more non-individualistic (collectivist) attitudes towards property 
compared to their Anglo-Canadian neighbours (Blomley, 2004, 95). The right to build 
fences along one’s property also meant different things between these two groups: a 
Chinese woman was offended (she understood this to be severing neighbourly ties) 
when her white neighbour decided to build a fence between their properties. The white 
neighbour was shocked to find out his neighbour felt this way. Thus, demonstrating a 
sharp cultural contrast in the meaning of property rights between neighbours (Blomley, 
2004, 98).  
Blomley states that “[t]he power to define a place can often mean the power to 
decide its destiny” (Blomley, 2002, 574). Conflicts over the meaning of property also 
include colonial relationships between Western European societies versus North 
American Aboriginal societies. In Canada, Western European philosophical notions 
favor the view that land (in the state of nature) which is not enclosed and given over to 
productive use (such as industry or cultivation) is seen as “waste” and what or how the 
land has been used before is irrelevant to its value (Blomley, 2002, 561). Indeed, 
Western philosophical views of space view simply land as “an empty vessel existing 
prior to the matter which fills it” (Blomley, 2016, 251).  
Aboriginal views of land-use (characterized as being mobile and communal) are 
viewed through the Western lens to be open to exploitation (Blomley, 2002, 567). 
Aboriginal, specifically the Coast Salish of Vancouver, notions of property and land-use 
are governed by seasonal use (temporary ownership) as a response to the ever-shifting 
availability of an area’s resources. Western culture and law, conversely, require 
residents to be permanent and non-moving (Blomley, 2002, 566-567). Whatever the 
values of a dominant culture be, thus they serve to underpin and be foundational of the 
laws (and bylaws) put into place. The following quote effectively describes how class 
and cultural conflict impact laws regulating land: “The power to define a place can often 
mean the power to decide its destiny” (Blomley, 574). As such, should a dominating 
culture or ideology in an area define (in a prohibitionist tone) their community as 
intolerant of certain “outsider” activities and groups of people, it will define their area to 
exclude as such.  
Discourse & the Drug War 
Much of the academic literature is critical of the various government drug policies 
that underpin the War on Drugs. There is also an increasing frustration within academia 
over the translation of academic scholarship around drug policy into effective legislative 
action by governments. Indeed, much of the literature highlights the role that ideological 
factors and morality politics play in the shaping of drug policy over the refined academic 
knowledge that has been accumulated and presented for governments (Fafard, 2012; 
Haden, 2008; Mosher and Yanagisako, 1991; Nadelmann, 1998). When there are 
successful changes in drug policy, it is almost always for the purpose of pragmatism 
and response to public pressure or brinksmanship (Levine, 2003; Fafard, 2012). Other 
critical discourse focuses on the ineffectiveness of drug policy and their failure to 
achieve their own goals (Bagley, 1988; Hughes and Stevens, 2010). 
Some researchers argue that drug prohibition hampers research by preventing 
studies into these outlawed substances that could lead to better treatments for drug 
users and other diseases (Haden, 2008, 2). Others point to evidence that the rates of 
drug use are not affected by increasing punitive measures against drug use (Hughes 
and Stevens, 2010, 999). Indeed, even those few academics like Bagley and 
Nadelmann that don’t necessarily oppose drug prohibition in principle take issue with 
the way it is being undertaken. For example, Bagley argues that far too much of the 
effort is being made towards strict, “supply-side” enforcement rather than more 
“demand”-oriented efforts including proper drug education, prevention and rehabilitation 
efforts (Bagley, 1988, 193).  
Bagley highlights the role “realism” plays in the failure of drug prohibition. He 
notes that a realist paradigm holds that “nation-states are key actors in international 
politics” and that threats to the system are to be met with the full power of the state 
(Bagley, 1988, 195). However, this ignores the real role that non-state actors (like 
international market forces and commercial entities) play in nurturing the drug trade and 
that many nation-states are not willing to put in an effort to stamp out illegal markets 
(Bagley, 1988, 198). Furthermore, drug prohibition has been criticized as being useful 
for business, maintaining state control as well as providing excuses (usually aided by 
propaganda and demonization) for social ills and, otherwise unjustifiable, violent force 
(Levine, 2003, 147). 
Regarding the involvement of political concerns or ideology in building drug 
policy and related laws as opposed to basing a public narcotics strategy on scientific 
data and scholarly work. There are many suggestions or direct assertions that political 
ideology of those in power influences the decision-making process of drug regulation 
and prohibition. Often these assertions are accompanied with frustration over the lack of 
scientific knowledge being utilized in the process.  
A frequent example of this frustration is the issue of harm reduction—a model of 
drug control that aims to reduce harms (evidence-based and pragmatically-considered) 
created by drug use to individual users, families and society as a whole (Haden, 2008, 
3). Harm reduction has been described in the literature as a radically tolerant and 
pragmatic approach to dealing with prohibition and drug use (Levine, 2003, 149). 
Likewise, others emphasizes how drug prohibition itself can work better and more 
effectively by focusing on minimizing the negative consequences produced by it 
(Nadelmann, 1998, 114). Similarly, other research focuses on other concurrent attempts 
to impact the system of drug prohibition and criminalization—such as Drug Treatment 
Courts. Such specialized courts operate within the criminal justice system in response 
to drug use and emphasize drug users not as criminals but as patients suffering from 
the disease of addiction (Lyons, 2014, 291). 
Examples of harm reduction strategies include providing clean syringes (to help 
reduce and prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS among users) and methadone. 
Furthermore, harm reduction strategies can cut down on the violation of civil liberties, 
keep non-violent offenders out of prison and stem disease epidemics resulting from 
strict punitive enforcement (Levine, 2003, 149). A frequently cited harm reduction effort 
is INSITE—the safe injection site (SIS) in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver—
mentions or alludes to harm reduction goal. However, successfully implementing harm 
reduction strategies has required extensive lobbying, protest and aggressive pressure 
on public officials by both activists and harm reduction experts (Fafard, 2012, 908). 
Currently there are over 75 safe injection sites operating globally but the Downtown 
Eastside’s INSITE is the only one in North America (Young, 2011, 87).  
Other literature points to successful and beneficial de-prohibition efforts in other 
countries such as Portugal (which decriminalized many narcotics in July 2001). Positive 
changes in illicit drug use (down in key populations), deaths (down), drug profits (down), 
seizures (up) and other items as a result of decriminalization in Portugal were in 
contrast to its neighbours (Spain and Italy). Researchers were cautious on whether 
decriminalization itself or its implementation created such changes (Hughes and 
Stevens, 2010, 1017). Scholars stressed the importance of nuance in the discussion 
over drug prohibition and harm reduction as well as making policy decisions based on 
ethics as well as research (Hughes and Stevens, 2010, 1018). 
Fafard notes that the distribution of scientific knowledge publicly may not be as 
effective on drug policy as one would hope (Fafard, 2012, 907). He asserts that a 
complex issue like drug policy is affected by political concerns (such as pragmatism) 
and differences in ideology more so than what is presented by science (Fafard, 2012, 
909).  For example, the creation of INSITE—a radical effort—was pragmatic and not 
necessarily scientific (they took inspiration from efforts in Switzerland) and health 
authorities applied for and received exemption from Canada’s Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act for this undertaking. However, a change in government (centrist Liberal 
to right-wing Conservative) saw a change in government ideology that sought to kill 
INSITE—no matter the science nor pragmatism over public health and harm reduction. 
The Supreme Court eventually ruled in favour of INSITE’s exemption only on the 
grounds of individuals’ Charter Rights; drug policy is otherwise unchanged (Fafard, 
2012, 906).  
Additionally, it has been pointed out that many state-sponsored messages 
published in support of prohibition and to get a fearful reaction from the public have 
directly and knowingly contradicted evidence from researchers (Haden, 2008, 6). This is 
compounded by the fact that scientific reports and recommendations have been 
repeatedly ignored by some politicians (Nadelmann, 1998, 121). In the face of this 
system, some academics argue for a system of drug policy based on “common sense, 
science, public health concerns, and human rights” (Nadelmann, 1998, 112). Others 
warn of the danger that a simplified and value-driven drug policy debate can have 
because policy based solely in political and moral values lacks the nuance and specifics 
provided by expertise (Mosher and Yanagisako, 1991, 314). Furthermore, moral 
arguments over drug prohibition have been challenged by researchers by arguing that a 
public health-based response ultimately best reflects society’s moral values (Mosher 
and Yanagisako, 1991, 315). Moreover, the prohibitionists’ moral arguments have been 
challenged by scholars such as Thomas Szasz on the grounds that a drug user has the 
right to choose to use drugs or not (he draws upon arguments from the assisted suicide 
debate) and that any sort of anti-drug action must be made by persuading the user to 
change of his/her own accord (Szasz, 1992, 161-162). 
Thus, the literature on drug policy and Drug Prohibition suggests that there is a 
continuing struggle between knowledge on the issues and the politicians and 
bureaucrats that can translate and implement this knowledge into concrete public policy. 
Essentially, there seems to be a divide between what the academic literature advises to 
government and what policy is enacted by government. Most researchers appear to 
indicate more and more confidence in a change in public attitudes around drug policy.  
Thus, from this literature, I view municipal bylaws both as tools for municipalities 
to participate in the larger War on Drugs as well as a means that oppresses or 
privileges certain classes of citizens over others. Similarly, I view municipal bylaws as 
imperfect tools since they are limited in their powers by higher levels of statutes and 
law. There is comparatively little work out there on the subject of marijuana as a 
municipal regulatory subject as opposed to the criminal law aspects of drug 
liberalization. Given the coming changes in drug policy, now is the time to look at how 
cities regulate controlled substances and how they came up with what they have 
enacted. Moreover, this paper aims to help fill this seemingly empty gap in drug, 
municipal law and socio-legal literature. Now I shall discuss the methods I used for this 
study. 
Methods 
I conducted document and discourse analysis of relevant municipal records. This 
involved close examination of text and audio-visual records of municipal bylaw 
information and proceedings which took place from late January to early March of 2017. 
The research was conducted both at municipal archives (for the audio-visual 
component) as well as at home using access to Delta’s online digital records database. 
These are records that few members of the public ever get a chance to see or even 
think about seeing despite technically being available for public scrutiny. As a Delta 
resident, I had the ability to reserve time and access these records that were related to 
my research interests. 
Since I was using document analysis as my primary method, I examined various 
municipal records such as: internal emails, memorandums, Council reports (drafted by 
staff for members of Delta Council) and statements or quotes given to news media 
(where available) that might reveal latent justifications for such bylaws. In addition, I 
analyzed and documented direct statements made by Council members as some of 
these bylaws (specifically the Controlled Substance Property Bylaw and the Delta 
Zoning Bylaw) were being created or amended. During the research I discovered that 
the Corporation of Delta did not keep any written transcripts of their council meetings. 
Instead, they kept their records (from the 1990s and early 2000s) in VHS. Thus, in the 
absence of actual transcripts of proceedings, however, I viewed video recordings of 
Delta Council meetings and took hand-written notes. 
There are particular reasons why I chose to use a qualitative documentary 
analysis for this study. For some of the subject matter, it is likely that many important 
individuals like councillors, planners and other city staff might have relocated to other 
jobs, retired, etc. since the early 2000s. Indeed, some city councillors referenced to later 
on in this paper, for example, have moved on to provincial or non-municipal politics. 
Even if they could be contacted, their memories of very specific policy discussions might 
not be clear or fully accurate assuming they remember what happened at all—some 
might be hesitant to talk about what is still a controversial topic. Furthermore, qualitative 
documentary analysis also consists of audio-video content, allowing for the inclusion of 
more subjective data that one could also collect from interviews and allow for data that 
is more contextual. Subjectivities across time and place may differ for an individual 
being interviewed in the present versus who they were when they were recorded 15-20 
years ago. Some documentary analyses allow for a clearer snapshot of the past than 
some interviews can (although recordings of interviews from the past could have 
provided helpful supplementary data). 
Documentary analysis allowed for a broader range of information to be 
considered and given context that person-to-person interview might lack. Similar 
research has been conducted using document analysis methodology by numerous 
academics. Researchers conducted analyses on undergraduate health sciences’ syllabi 
and study guides at a university in South Africa (Coetzee, Hoffmann, and de Roubaix, 
2015, 390-391) to come up with their findings (which they found unsatisfactory 
application and education on human research ethics in the studied field). Likewise, 
investigative journalists are known to examine and publish findings on government 
documents that they have obtained via Access to Information or Freedom of Information 
requests made to government departments (Walby and Larsen, 2012, 32).  
Before acquiring the videos, I examined the minutes of city council meetings and 
reports in order to find out the specific dates of meetings. However, according the 
municipal clerk’s office, video recordings of Delta Council meeting have not all been 
transferred to a digital storage media format (and were unlikely to be done so in an 
appropriate amount of time) and many thousands of hours of footage remain stored on 
their original VHS tape copies—of which these are the only known extant copies. 
Accessing these recordings was slowed by the fact that, at first, city staff were not sure 
where the tapes were stored and recommended that I also contact staff at Delta Cable, 
a privately-owned, local television provider which has recorded such proceedings for the 
city. However, the director (who had been director for the early 2000s recordings I was 
looking for) said that they did not keep their own copies from that particular era and 
advised me to check back with the municipality.  
Fortunately, city staff contacted told me that they had managed to locate the 
tapes and we made arrangements to view their contents. However, the municipal clerk 
advised me of the possibility that not all potentially research-valuable meetings would 
have necessarily been recorded. She said that such executive or closed meetings were 
not available to the public and were unlikely to have been recorded on VHS or 
otherwise. I took this potential gap in information into account while conducting my 
examination. 
Cognizant of the limited number of extant copies, I took extra care in handling 
these tapes and with attention to keeping them in working order for later use. Archive 
staff assisted me in being able to properly and safely view these video recordings by 
providing me with space and the necessary equipment. Initially there were issues in 
finding properly functioning equipment for viewing these tapes since use of VHS players 
are becoming more infrequent. Before acquiring the tapes, I examined the minutes of 
city council meetings and reports in order to find out the specific dates of meetings so 
that I only required and played tapes that were relevant and reduced the unnecessary 
risk of potential damage or wear of unneeded tapes. Nevertheless, the quality of the 
recordings varied greatly as some of them suffered from poor audio and problems with 
the video feed (I suspect there were issues in the recording equipment since the player 
and tapes appeared to be in perfectly working order). 
Most non-VHS recording data was collected primarily collected via access to 
publicly available documents including, but not limited to, official policy documents, city 
council minutes and others. Many of these are available electronically by searching of 
Delta’s online, digital database known as the “Document Center” which is hosted on 
delta.civicweb.net (other municipalities in British Columbia are hosted on this network 
via their internet subdomain names). Information collection was also made through 
direct requests to the municipal clerk’s office and visits to the local municipal archives.  
The most important documents will be the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw 
(CSPB) and the Delta Zoning Bylaw (DZB) themselves, but these were the starting 
points from which related documents will be searched for. I was initially concerned that 
the web database may not have the necessary advanced search capabilities in order to 
narrow down categories such as the year of production. However, adequate search 
functions existed and were used accordingly. Searches of the municipal documents 
database involved inputting specific search terms such as “marihuana” (this term was 
frequently used by government and it became necessary to adjust my own language by 
spelling marijuana with an “h”) and using narrowing search functions to dispose of 
documents that were either repetitive or not useful. Reports made by municipal staff to 
Delta Council were among the most useful documents as they contained information on 
the context and proposed ideas for the bylaws as well as specific examination of the 
bylaws as they were in development. Not all documents obtained were found to be 
relevant or useful to this research. Some documents were simply records of a document 
having been read or were internal letters/memos informing other members of the 
municipal staff that a bylaw has been adopted (with little to no other relevant information 
contained within them).  
News articles relevant to my research were collected using a variety of methods: 
for news articles from the early 2000s (when print media was still more dominant than 
online content) I utilized news media search engines provided by the Kwantlen 
Polytechnic University Library—specifically the search engine Canadian NewsStream. 
For more current articles, simple Google news searches were used. In both of these 
methods, it was necessary to input specific search terms in order to find appropriate 
articles. For example, the following query, “(marijuana grow-ops) AND bylaw AND 
Delta”, was entered—with full text and English-language options—in order to find 
newspaper articles that fit this specified category. Online news media had the 
advantage of being able to provide hyperlinks to related articles or source content that 
journalists were referencing.  
The data analysis focused on two different bylaws representing two different 
categories of the regulation of marijuana: the first focused on a bylaw intended to 
address the phenomenon of illegal marijuana growing operations. This bylaw is called 
the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw of 2004 and analysis involved examining 
audio-visual recordings of city council meetings on the topic as well as with official 
written documentation. The second section focused on a bylaw intended to regulate 
medicinal cannabis activities: specifically, the Delta Zoning Bylaw which, since it 
regulates land-use for virtually all categories in the municipalities, contains provisions 
specific to commercial activities involving the medicinal use of cannabis. Analysis of it 
involved examining documentation of its development and application (for which there 
are specific examples from both municipal databases as well as from the provincial 
judiciary).  
Printouts were made of some documents so that any key observations can be 
made in pen, pencil and highlighter. By using physical copies, I was able to arrange and 
organize my time so that I could focus on one section and not get distracted by working 
on the other (I did this extensively while conducting my literature review). This is a 
personal organizational arrangement of mine that I find helps me organize time more 
effectively. Analysis of data involved note-taking and notes in the margins of the 
documents—the coding will open and be oriented more towards identifying latent 
content. Important sections or passages were highlighted and saved to be included in 
the final project draft. 
Relevant court cases were accessed via the Kwantlen Polytechnic University 
Library’s access to Canadian legal databases as well as through links provided in online 
news media articles (an ability that traditional printed media obviously lacks). Further 
information and commentary was also obtained through local news media (for instance, 
local newspaper Delta Optimist). Looking for information on the CSPB, I made an 
additional search for records post-2004 for the purpose of seeking information on 
challenges, amendments, enforcement and other relevant items made after the bylaw 
came into force.  
Since this is information used in this research that is publicly available and in the 
public domain (created and published by a government institution) there can be no 
issue regarding any breach in research ethics. However, while research ethics is 
normally concerned with minimizing and/or preventing harm done to human subjects, 
there ought to be similar ethics discussions on records that are at heightened risk of 
loss or damage and are either extremely difficult or impossible to replace. The loss or 
damage of the medium results in the information becoming lost. Such information is the 
common property of all citizens whose ownership functions to hold their elected officials 
accountable and being able to make informed democratic decisions based on this 
information. Therefore a study like this one is needed to expand the field of research 
ethics to include provisions for more collective concerns—minimizing harms to 
individual research subjects but also minimizing harm to culture, society and institutions 
of democracy. 
Research Findings 
There are two bylaws extant in Delta that address the production and 
manufacture of marijuana. One is the 2004 Controlled Substance Property Bylaw (or 
CSPB) which acts under definitions of the federal Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(CDSA) (CSPB, 2004, 2) and includes the following prohibition: “No person, owner or 
occupant of property shall cause, permit or allow any property to become or remain a 
place for the manufacture, trade, use, sharing, sale or barter of a controlled substance” 
(CSPB, 2004, 3). The bylaw includes provisions allowing for municipal enforcement 
inspection, cutting off of utilities and monetary penalties (CSPB, 2004, 3-6). The 
financial disincentives introduced specifically were fines of $5000 per day of continued 
non-compliance. The primary activities that the CSPB regulates are clandestine 
marijuana growing operations—targeting, in particular, the rental property owners on 
whose property activities take place (Corporation of Delta, 2004, pp.2-4, Attachment B). 
The official purpose behind the CSPB is as follows:  
“WHEREAS the Community Charter as amended, provides that a municipal 
council may by bylaw: 
a) regulate, prohibit and impose requirements for protecting and enhancing 
the well being of the community relating to nuisances, disturbances and other 
noxious or offensive business activities; b) provide for the recovery of costs 
incurred by the municipality in effecting compliance at the expense of a person 
who has failed to comply with the bylaw” (Delta Controlled Substance Property 
Bylaw No. 6200, 2004, p. 1). 
The use of marijuana or cannabis for medicinal purposes may be not be 
prohibited (as per the Access to Cannabis for Medical Purposes Regulations of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act) but Delta’s use of municipal zoning laws 
effectively enforces a prohibitionist agenda. The second bylaw in this study is the Delta 
Zoning Bylaw No. 2750 or DZB. This bylaw, works in conjunction with other municipal 
ordinances (such as those regulating business licenses), as it regulates and enforces 
other aspects of marijuana prohibition. Specifically, this bylaw (No. 2750) contains 
provisions restricting and prohibiting (commercial) land-use within the boundaries of the 
Corporation of Delta for the purposes of medical marijuana manufacture and 
distribution. I studied these bylaws in order to search for the justifications or reasoning 
processes behind them as well as what sort of impacts (class, legal, economic or 
otherwise) that they have had on the community. 
The ability to for the Delta Zoning Bylaw to regulate land-use with regards to 
medicinal marijuana was made possible through a bylaw amendment (Bylaw No. 7313) 
which prohibited the use of land, buildings or structures for the growing, cultivations, 
drying, testing, packaging, storage, distribution and/or the sale of marijuana in all zones 
with the exception Agricultural Land Reserve (ALR) where it does not apply 
(Corporation of Delta, Memo, 2014, Attachment A, 2). This amendment was done by 
adding new definitions to the Part II General Interpretations section of the Delta Zoning 
Bylaw (eg. “Medical Marihuana Production”, etc.) and under Part III, Operative Clauses 
explicitly prohibiting, under the sub-heading “Prohibited Uses in All Zones”, “Production 
of Medical Marihuana” and “Medical Marihuana Research and Development” 
(Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2014, 2-3).  
The amendment to the DZB (amendment No. 7313) initially came with a sister 
regulation—7314—that was to prohibit medical marijuana production inside of the 
Agricultural Land Reserve but was denied for reasons I will discuss later at length 
(Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2014, 2). However, this denial as well as the 
wording of Bylaw 7313 did open a loophole for medical marijuana production provided 
that, on the Agricultural Land Reserve, the property where production would take place 
be classified as a Comprehensive Development Zone (Corporation of Delta, Council 
Report, 2015, 1). As such, any proposed medical marijuana production facility would 
require application to Council for a site-specific rezoning amendment (Corporation of 
Delta, Council Report, 2014, 4).  
In conducting my research, I explored justifications used by members of local 
government to support these sorts of marijuana-restrictive bylaws and related legal 
activities enacted by the Corporation of Delta (as noted in the below sections). Using 
strategies I mentioned earlier in the methods section of this paper, I searched for the 
informal/latent justifications, reasoning and thought processes found outside of the 
formal justification (that is, the official reasons) and the announcements of them that 
one can read in official municipal statements and from the bylaws themselves (as well 
as in the minutes of the meetings themselves).  
Bylaws for illegal grow-ops 
I watched and researched the meetings that involved the CSPB proposal and 
enactment since they are really the earliest bylaws in Delta that seem to deal with the 
subject of marijuana—specifically with the wave of marijuana growing operations raids 
of the early 2000s. In researching this bylaw, both pre- and post-enactment, themes of 
Council professionalism, frustration and regional tension, and issues requiring 
amendments to the bylaw.  
i. Professionalism 
One particular topic of discussion that came up repeatedly in the CSPB 
proceedings in Delta Council was the idea of using these prohibitionist bylaws as a 
means of generating a regular income or as a cost recovery mechanism for drug law 
enforcement operations conducted by Delta. However, from my observations (of video 
content) there seemed to be a noticeable difference in how members of council (which 
included Mayor, councillors and some of their staff) treated the content as serious. It is 
clear that some councillors took the matter of bylaws as a mechanism of drug law 
enforcement more seriously than others. For example, Cllr. Guy Gentner and Mayor 
Lois Jackson had an uneventful discussion regarding grow-op home seizures, provincial 
police board jurisdiction and proposing that city staff draft a report on federal drug 
legislation. Fellow Cllr. Scott Hamilton seemed to take this discussion down a more 
comedic road.  Indeed, at two different meetings of Delta Council, Cllr. Hamilton made 
comments that quickly became jokes about the rather serious subject at hand. His first 
comment in June 16th, 2003 meeting went as follows: “Given new sophistication and 
upscale nature of grow-operations these days. Some of the people are setting up in 
$3/4 million homes—It might be a whole new revenue source for us. So….” Cllr. 
Hamilton then laughs and is followed by the rest of Council in laughing as well—to 
which Mayor Lois Jackson replies somewhat nervously: “Be careful what you wish.” 
(Adlem, Regular Meeting, 2003).  
Cllr. Hamilton made this seemingly careless comment again at the September 8th 
Council meeting where he goes: “It could be a great revenue source, you never know” 
after which he laughs and smiles. But unlike the previous meeting, Mayor Jackson was 
quick to correct the councillor as to the seriousness of the subject. It is disquieting to 
think that in the drafting stage of bylaws containing very real financial consequences 
some members of a city council might take this process lightly. Even more troubling is 
the implication that such a bylaw might be considered as a regular revenue source for a 
city. For this to be a regular source of revenue would necessitate the continuing 
existence of clandestine marijuana grow-ops being set up in residential neighbourhoods 
and keeping them at risk—completely negating an otherwise prohibitionist statute’s 
raison d'être. Likewise, the aforementioned 2006 evaluation of the CSPB showed an 
overall negative decline in the number of marijuana growing operations detected and 
responded to by enforcement officials via non-compliance notices (Corporation of Delta, 
Council Report, 2006, 2-3)—further putting into question the long-term viability of this as 
a municipal revenue source that Cllr. Hamilton seemed to imply.  
In these proceedings there are also examples of rhetoric that appears oriented in 
favor of War on Drugs polices and attitudes. In the Delta Council meeting on June 16th, 
2003, Cllr. Guy Gentner asks Mayor Lois Jackson for her comment, on the basis of her 
being chair of the police board, on a proposed report from staff on municipal 
implications on federal drug property confiscations. She states that Delta has a “zero 
tolerance level relative to [marijuana] grow-operations” (Adlem, Regular Meeting, 2003). 
In the Delta Council meeting on September 8th later that year, Cllr. Hamilton, when 
discussing previous bylaw fines imposed by the neighbouring City of Surrey in their 
drug-control bylaws, he noted that the average $1500 fine for property owners in 
violation of the ordinance seemed “a little light” and considered the idea of increasing 
that amount for their own bylaw (Adlem, Regular Meeting, 2003).  
In a consultation meeting on February 9th, 2004, Delta Police Chief Jim Cessford 
made a surprising comment on the proposed Controlled Substances Bylaw:  
“Unfortunately, and I shouldn’t say unfortunately, I need to say that the driving 
force behind this particular bylaw is the planning department and I’m very much 
in support of this and it’s a great idea. I wish we had thought of it ourselves. I like 
to think we’re pretty proactive with things. But they were on top of this” and he 
described this proposal as a “huge victory” (Adlem, Regular Meeting, 2004).  
Cessford also discussed how his department had been dealing with the issue of 
marijuana grow operations during the regional Operation “Bud-Out” and the risks 
involved in order to “take these things down”. Despite the casual use of paramilitary-
style language in discussing counter-narcotics operations, the Chief, in reference to the 
reduced number of grow-ops found since the start of “Bud-Out” (from over 200 to less 
than 25), made a surprising remark that some of the grow-ops police had raided 
“weren’t that active” when they were found (Adlem, Regular Meeting, 2004). The casual 
use of austere and militant War on Drugs-style rhetoric in the development of the CSPB 
might impact how seriously members of municipal council will discuss potential 
outcomes of the bylaw, outcomes that could have serious human and financial 
consequences to those involved should the bylaw not be enforced with due care. 
ii. Municipal Frustration & Regional Tensions 
Through analyzing council meetings footage, there were indications of 
dissatisfaction and frustration on the part of members of Delta Council in regards to 
higher levels of government (federal, provincial and the judiciary). In addition, there was 
evidence of regional tensions. On September 8th 2003, Mayor Lois Jackson responded 
in a disciplinarily manner to Cllr. Hamilton (who had joked about cost recovery of police 
drug enforcement operations being a new revenue source), the Mayor gave this 
informative speech on the limited powers of municipal government: “We tend to forget at 
the local level that we don’t have any status…In dealing with the federal government, 
they deal with provincial governments. They do not deal with local governments. We are 
not entrenched in the Constitution. We are not a recognized local level of governance” 
(words italicized for emphasis) (Adlem, Regular Meeting, 2003). Her statement is 
related to her comments at the previous Council meeting on June 16th, 2003 where, on 
the subject of obtaining shares in the proceeds of crime, she stated that allocation of 
benefits were the responsibility of the BC provincial government. She further highlights 
problematic situation where money that ought to be used to assist local governments, 
whom are “going to the absolute “-nth” degree to protect the citizenry”, is going to other 
jurisdictions. She further indicated issues with fighting these problems in the court 
system “the way they are today” (Adlem, Regular Meeting, 2003).  
In addition to simple frustration with Canada’s government superstructure, there 
appeared in the September 8th, 2003 meeting of Delta Council to be an underlying 
attitude of regional rivalry apparent to viewers (Gulyas, September 10, 2003, p. 5). At 
this meeting Jackson also shared with Council a “tongue-in-cheek” (her words) 
experience of hers at the 2000 Canadian Federation of Municipalities conference in 
Halifax, Nova Scotia. She reported that representatives of cities from the rest of Canada 
“didn’t know what we were talking about” when Delta and other BC municipalities 
discussed the topic of marijuana grow-ops. Mayor Jackson concludes her story with this 
remark:  
“Quite interesting to note that now that Central Canada, Ontario, the Prairie 
Provinces and Quebec are experiencing large grow-operations—suddenly the 
federal government has taken some action.” (Adlem, Regular Meeting, 2003).  
What is clear is that municipal government discourse of marijuana growing 
operations tend to exhibit underlying regional rivalries and alienation. Relevant to this 
tendency is a frustration with the overall structure of government authority, particularly 
when it comes to the ability (or lack thereof) of municipal/local governments to be 
recognized by federal authorities. Regional rivalries and feelings of alienation and 
frustration with governmental authority has both cultural (differences in zeitgeist and 
geographical inequalities) and practical (financial concerns and inequalities in power) 
origins.  
iii. Continuous Evaluations & Amendments 
The 2006 evaluation of the bylaw by Delta city staff provides insight into the 
effectiveness of the bylaw as well as to unforeseen problems with the bylaw that 
necessitated amendments. On February 24th, 2006, two years after the CSPB was 
originally passed, the bylaw underwent an evaluation by the Corporation’s Community 
Planning and Development Department. The evaluation report noted that since the 
bylaw’s passing, 53 properties (27 in 2004, 20 in 2005 and 6 in 2006 before the review’s 
publishing) were issued non-compliance notices with 41 of them successfully meeting 
requirements for remediation (that is, becoming compliant with the bylaw so they can be 
re-occupied by potential tenants), 12 other properties had not remediated with the city. It 
is important to note that only one other property was found to be in contravention of the 
bylaw. And, that property did not, in fact, have a grow operation on it (Corporation of 
Delta, Council Report, 2006, 2-3).  
Corporation staff regularly visits non-compliant properties to ensure the notice 
remains posted and the building is unoccupied. They do not enter buildings without prior 
arrangements with owners and assess their occupancy based on residency indicators 
(such as lights, vehicles present, removal of “No Occupancy” sign, etc.) (Corporation of 
Delta, Council Report, 2006, 3). Inspection service charges include billings for regular 
and overtime pay for police officers involved in the relevant marijuana grow operation 
closure—about $22,050 had been collected since the bylaw’s adoption (Corporation of 
Delta, Council Report, 2006, 4). However, inspection efforts had been hampered by 
unresponsive owners, purposefully inaccurate contact information, undeliverable mailing 
addresses and non-cooperation from owners (such as houses being boarded up to 
prevent inspection). Staff highlighted these barriers to bylaw compliance and stated they 
would report to Council regarding potential amendments to the bylaw (Corporation of 
Delta, Council Report, 2006, 3-4). Additionally, as late as 2014, amendments to the 
Bylaw Notice Enforcement Bylaw and the Municipal Ticketing Information Bylaw were 
required in order for bylaw inspectors and Delta police to be able to issue fines to non-
commercial medicinal marijuana growing operations without the risk of lengthy, costly 
court processes (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2014).  
This is important to my research in that it highlights potential, unintended flaws 
that even the most thoroughly discussed bylaw proposal can be affected by. Although 
bylaws, particularly those regulating controversial economic activities (such as 
cannabis-growing), are regularly and diligently subjected to evaluation and amendment, 
it is troubling know that such possibilities of thwarting the bylaws were not anticipated by 
staff or by Council. 
Medicinal Cannabis and Zoning 
 I read various council reports, memos and news items involving details of the 
Delta Zoning Bylaw provisions concerning medicinal cannabis-related businesses and 
commercial enterprises. It was here that I found documents relevant to two rezoning 
applications for businesses intending to establish facilities for the industrial production of 
medicinal cannabis on Delta’s Agricultural Land Reserve. Likewise, I examined news 
reports, memos and the Supreme Court of British Columbia case file on the 
WeeMedical medicinal cannabis dispensary in North Delta—a business enterprise that 
was attempting provide medical cannabis to eligible customers in the area and was 
ordered closed by the municipality or incur fines. 
i. Production/manufacturing activity 
The Delta Zoning Bylaw, as mentioned in earlier, prohibits medicinal cannabis 
production outside of the Agricultural Land Reserve (ALR). Should an entity or business 
decide to establish medicinal cannabis production on the ALR, the municipality requires 
an application for rezoning to be made and approved (with appropriate feedback from 
the public). Delta Council opened discussion and feedback from local businesses, 
organizations and other members of the public for proposed projects involving zoning or 
business license applications (such as establishing commercial medical cannabis 
manufacturing facilities in the Tilbury Industrial Park). The Document Centre contained 
several PDF files which included some of the emailed responses that the Corporation 
received. Two major medical marijuana production projects requiring rezoning 
applications were proposed to the Corporation of Delta by Canpacific Engineering 
Incorporated, for a business at 7331 Vantage Way operating under the subsidiary Delta 
Pharms Incorporated and International Herbs Medical Marijuana Limited (for a business 
at 1668 Foster’s Way) respectively (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2015, 1) 
(Corporation of Delta, Memo, 2014, 2) (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2016, 1). It 
is here that one could suggest that prohibitionist responses affecting the decision-
making process would emerge as a factor. 
Unfortunately there was little material in Delta’s government document database 
that discussed the Foster’s Way application for an industrial marijuana production 
facility similar to the one proposed at the Vantage Way site. This is likely due to the 
Foster’s Way medicinal cannabis production project being more recent. Information on 
the Vantage Way application for establishing a medicinal cannabis production 
operation, on the other hand, was more substantial and thus this case is the focus. A 
memorandum from the Director of the Community Planning and Development 
department was sent on June 17, 2014 to the Mayor and Council, in regards to the 
Vantage Way project, with attached public correspondence regarding proposed medical 
marijuana production facility. This memo was preceded by a report some weeks earlier 
on May 28th that summarized the contents of the memo. Only one letter out of eight 
from the public and business community was supportive of the proposed rezoning. The 
rest of the letters ranged in response from concern to outright hostility.  
The May 28th report indicated overall concerns, reported by business owners, 
associated with an industrial medical marijuana facility. Specifically, they highlighted 
issues with odor, air quality reduction, potential criminal activity, employee safety and 
falling property values (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2014, 3). However, the 
report lacked the specificity or informality that the memo contained. In the memo itself, it 
was found many responses were not necessarily against the concept of pharmaceutical 
cannabis production but rather voiced oppositional concerns over the possibility of 
managing and regulating such a facility effectively. They regularly expressed concern 
over inventory control and frequently referred to fears of unintended crime and “misuse” 
(Corporation of Delta, Memo, 2014, Attachment, 3-4). Another based their concerns on 
the uncertainty of whether the facility would have the same type types of emissions 
controls found in heavy industry (Corporation of Delta, Memo, 2014, Attachment, 4). 
One such respondent even went so far as to clarify that they deemed the Delta Pharms 
owners themselves to be “men of character and trustworthy” (Corporation of Delta, 
Memo, 2014, Attachment, 3). A short letter by another business owner said simply that 
they “respectfully request” that the rezoning be dropped. That said, some letters 
(including the aforementioned) did not actually give reason or justification for their 
opposition (Corporation of Delta, Memo, 2014, Attachment A, 5, 9). 
Other responses by Tilbury business owners contained statements indicating a 
more hostile skepticism. One respondent voiced their opposition to the project and 
wrote quotation marks around the word “medical” when referring to medical marijuana 
(Corporation of Delta, Memo, 2014, Attachment, 7) which seemed to suggest (stringent 
government regulation and scientific research notwithstanding) that the whole concept 
of medicinal cannabis is inherently fraudulent. Another respondent stated that such a 
business would result in “lots of undesirable characters hanging around the area” 
(Corporation of Delta, Memo, 2014, Attachment, 6). A business owner that chose to 
remain anonymous disparagingly referred to the proposing as a “grow-op” and justified 
their stance stating: “I’ve heard nothing, but bad things about them and we certainly 
don’t want that type of activity within the Park![sic]” (Corporation of Delta, Memo, 2014, 
Attachment, 8). Additionally, most of these responses (both mild and hostile) use, in 
some variation, the phrase “this type of business” (emphasis added) to refer to a 
medical marijuana enterprise.  
ii. Retail and distributor activity 
Delta’s zoning bylaw has had negative legal and financial consequences for those 
establishing retail operations for medicinal cannabis. The provincial court case Delta v. 
WeeMedical was a specific example of bylaw enforcement being utilized as a means to 
regulate and minimize the presence of medicinal cannabis. In this case, the commercial 
enterprise being regulated is a medicinal cannabis dispensary in North Delta operated 
by the WeeMedical Dispensary Society. 
In correspondence with the Corporation of Delta, WeeMedical appealed 
Council’s decision to deny their business license on several grounds with these most 
notable: their status and mandate as a non-profit society; they were following 
appropriate health, safety and patient privacy procedures; over 300 people had signed 
up indicating a local need for it; the lack of ease of accessing this medication; the 
hypocrisy of denying medicinal cannabis while permitting tobacco and alcohol; they did 
not keep any cannabis products on the premises after-hours; and the fact that the only 
legal method of obtaining medical cannabis is by Canada Post from licensed producers. 
Critically, they argued that the zoning law definitions of “Medical Marihuana Production” 
and “Medical Marihuana Research and Development” were not applicable to 
WeeMedical as they only operated as a retail-level intermediary between patient and 
producer. WeeMedical gave a final appeal on the grounds that the alternative to their 
existence was to put patients in danger by purchasing from criminal sources and that 
the changing legal landscape in Canada necessitates Delta to act in a progressive 
manner towards medicinal marijuana (M.J. Liu, business communication, May 12, 
2016).  
The Property Use and Compliance Department reported back to Council 6 days 
after WeeMedical filed its appeal. They recommended that Council uphold its decision 
to denial their business license and continue to fine the applicant for not ceasing 
business operations (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2016, 1). This decision was 
made on the basis that the Corporation does not issue business licenses for unlawful 
activities (for which they refer to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act of Canada as 
foundation). They clarified that definition of “Medical Marihuana Production” found in the 
DZB included the use of a property and/or the buildings on a property for storage, 
distribution or sale of medicinal cannabis. Property Use and Compliance also noted that 
the WeeMedical Dispensary Society had not obtained (under the Marihuana for Medical 
Purposes Regulations) appropriate licensing from Health Canada.  
There was also the issue of the WeeMedical facility being too close in proximity 
to a nearby pharmacy (Naz’s Pharmacy), the Delta Zoning Bylaw also prohibits drug 
stores, polyclinics and pharmacies from being less than 400 metres apart (WeeMedical 
and Naz’s were within 200 metres of each other) (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 
2016, 2). Likewise, WeeMedical’s status as a non-profit society did not, under British 
Columbia’s Society Act, exclude them from carrying out business and, likewise, did not 
exclude them from the jurisdiction of the Business Licence Bylaw (Corporation of Delta, 
Council Report, 2016, 3).  
The owners of WeeMedical brought a legal challenge against the Corporation. 
However, the British Columbia Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Corporation of 
Delta against the dispensary over ticketed fines in contravention of their zoning and 
business license bylaws. Despite being denied a license by the city, the dispensary had 
continued to operate at their location and incurred approximately $11,900 in fines from 
municipal bylaw enforcement. Lawyers for WeeMedical argued to put a hold on 
proceedings citing potential changes in law coming from then-concurrent legal cases 
(which will be addressed in the Discussion section) in the federal court system. 
However, BC Supreme Court Justice Shelley Fitzpatrick stood with her decision based 
on the legal landscape of the (relative) present—upholding the law prohibiting marijuana 
dispensaries: “Until that happens, all people in British Columbia, including WeeMedical, 
are required to obey those laws” (Delta v. WeeMedical) (Smith, 2016). In addition to 
being restrictive of allowing marijuana-related retail business into a municipality’s 
commercial zones, it seems clear from the research is that the courts are not flexible or 
willing to take progressive actions even if consciously aware that the laws are about to 
change.  
Statements to Media 
Local news media (digital/online and in traditional print) analyzed and recorded 
statements and opinions by local government officials on the subject of these 
ordinances on marijuana. The reason for looking at local media is to search for and 
analyze discourse on these bylaws with emphasis on quotes or statements made by the 
politicians involved. At times, quotes made by local politicians leave no doubt as what 
justifies their governing decisions.  
Unfortunately, news articles from the period leading up to the creation of the 
Controlled Substances Property Bylaw did not contain very much subject matter or 
opinions from council-members or other officials that was unknown from looking at 
video-recorded Council proceedings. Local and community news sources from that time 
that I looked at included articles that appeared in the Delta Optimist (Delta’s sole local 
print newspaper since the dissolution of the South Delta Leader), The Vancouver Sun 
and The Province. What does come up as a repeated theme is the framing of the bylaw 
and the issue of marijuana grow-ops in the context of health and safety and, in 
particular, as a fight to save the community.  
Cllr. Robert Campbell was quoted as saying that a bylaw that addressed 
marijuana grow-ops was a “necessary step” because of the neighbourhood hazards 
created by these drug operations wherever they are found (Delta Optimist, February 11, 
2004, p. 3). Mayor Lois Jackson was quoted in the Province saying that it would be 
“necessary to sell out a neighbour to save a neighbourhood” (Dawson, April 16, 2000, p. 
A12) while in The Vancouver Sun she was quoted as saying that grow-ops had been 
allowed to move and start “destroying the neighbourhoods” because members of the 
community have “lost touch with one another” (Bellett, May 15, 2000, p. B1/Front). An 
idea highlighted in some of the news articles that rarely came up in conversation during 
proceedings is the idea that this type of bylaw can act as a “disincentive to discourage 
these facilities from becoming established” (Delta Optimist, February 11, 2004, p. 3). 
Such statements, however, drew criticism from BC Civil Liberties Association executive 
director John Westwood—who found such a “snitch” mentality to be lacking in any sort 
of sense of community. He argued that these sorts of anti-grow-op initiatives (where one 
“snitched” on one’s own neighbours) were “police-based” rather than “community-
based” and were of a different sort from traditional community anti-crime programs such 
as Block Watch (Dawson, April 16, 2000, p. A12).  
Articles that are relevant to the Delta Zoning Bylaw, such as zoning project 
proposal processes and municipal responses to wider government changes, were 
easier to find. Although her comments were focused on the wider issue of marijuana 
use rather than on municipal actions regarding the drug, Lois Jackson commented on 
the federal Allard v. Canada ruling (which will become more relevant in the Discussion 
section) with concern over the speed and uncertainty associated with legalization. She 
expressed the specific concern over the potential issue that industrial production of 
cannabis on agricultural land might displace food production from the land’s use. 
Jackson gave a simple warning: “We have to be careful what we create” before urging 
readers to wait for the (federal) Liberals’ centralized cannabis market scheme similar to 
liquor (Browne, 2016).  
Councillor Bruce McDonald, in the vote to approve for third reading the Delta 
Pharms growing operation in Tilbury, noted that, aside from the business meeting the 
appropriate procedural criteria, he had a deceased friend who he states could have 
benefit from medicinal cannabis. At that same vote, however, Mayor Lois Jackson 
stated, in opposition, that Council had not considered the interests of neighbouring 
businesses and argued that “If this was proposed for a residential area, we would have 
paid more attention to what they had to say” (Gyarmati, 2014).  
This claim by the Mayor runs counter to assurances made by Delta Pharms 
president David Rose of the involvement of Health Canada and Delta Police in ensuring 
regulatory compliance. He furthermore argued that his company be properly referred to 
as a pharmaceutical company and not a “grow op” (Gyarmati, 2014)—which would be a 
reasonable description from an objective viewpoint. Despite her opposition, she did 
state that other communities ought to take on their “fare share” of businesses of this 
type (Gyarmati, 2014)—not necessarily opposing licensed medical marijuana growing 
enterprises from existing, just not in Delta. This is reminiscent of NIMBY.  
In short, the findings of this research uncovered important themes to consider in 
the study of municipal bylaws that are specific to the regulation of cannabis-related 
activities. There are multiple examples of prohibitionist-oriented rhetoric being used by 
either public officials or members of the community to justify regulatory efforts or to 
repudiate proposed changes to the prohibitionist system that is in place. However, this 
was not always so as there were also examples (from members of Council mostly) of 
rhetoric that defied traditional talking-points defending marijuana prohibition. Indeed, not 
all prohibitionist rhetoric was necessarily made on the basis on the drug’s immorality but 
on concerns that were reasonable and progressively-oriented. 
For the CSPB, which penalizes land-use for illegal marijuana grow-ops in 
residential areas, there were frequently issues with how seriously some members of 
Council approached or discussed the subject of such residential property seizures and 
fines leading to other members disciplining them. Additionally, meetings discussing the 
development of the CSPB exposed clear frustration by members of Delta Council with 
higher levels of government regarding the limited powers that municipalities can 
leverage with provincial and federal authorities for what they believe are their dues. 
Furthermore, this bylaw contained flaws that required amendments and updates to be 
added in the years post-enactment. Likewise, there was also frustration and alienation 
with leaders of other Canadian regions whom, unlike municipalities in British Columbia, 
were unconcerned with the growing problem of marijuana grow-ops in the early-2000s. 
Similar emotions were also directed towards the federal government in Ottawa which, 
as mentioned early, appeared to not take action on grow-ops until they reached the 
central and eastern regions of Canada. What these particular findings suggest are the 
existence of East versus West cultural tensions, alienations and rivalries on the subject 
of drug policy—belief in the hegemony of one region over another is also possible.  
The correspondence on proposed projects relevant to the DZB, which contain 
provisions imposing prohibitions and limitations on land-use for medicinal cannabis, 
similarly show evidence of prohibitionist/War on Drugs ideology and, sometimes vitriolic, 
rhetoric. This was especially so in public correspondence between landowners and the 
city on the subject of a proposed industrial development hosting medicinal cannabis 
growing facilities. For a dispensary in North Delta, correspondence between itself and 
the municipality displayed more of a dispute over legal definitions. Whereas the 
dispensary made arguments by both challenging the actual meaning of land-use 
definitions in the bylaw as well as appealing on situational grounds (such as the number 
of people reliant on the drugs, the risks of having them turn to illegal markets and the 
moral imperative for progressive change in a fast-changing legal landscape on 
cannabis), the municipality took a strict, black-letter position on the bylaw’s definitions. It 
made no attempt to respond to extra-legal considerations in favor of relaxing bylaw 
enforcement. 
The findings of this research outlined the development of marijuana-related 
bylaws such as the Controlled Substance Property Bylaw and relevant sections of the 
Delta Zoning Bylaw. These bylaws each address different aspects of marijuana 
production including illegal residential grow-ops and medicinal production in industrial 
and commercial zones. In the bylaws’ development, it became clear that there were 
ongoing issues of how professionally or seriously some officials seemed to handle 
grow-op discussions as well as limited War on Drugs-style rhetoric. There were also 
clear indications of regional tension and frustration with higher levels of government 
(and the political structure behind it). The bylaws were also continuously amended due 
to problems with enforcement. Rezoning applications and business license appeals 
were also found that were filed on behalf of their business owners (whom were involved 
in medicinal cannabis production and distribution) so that they could legally operate in 
their requested zone (as long as they were within the boundaries of the Agricultural 
Land Reserve). In these rezoning applications/appeals, evidence of prohibitionist 
ideology were more apparent. Ideological tendencies represented in media were mixed 
as city officials and commentators gave varying perspectives of the issue of recreational 
and medicinal cannabis. Overall, extra-legal justifications for these bylaws were varied: 
practical concerns were as prevalent as prohibitionist ideals. 
Discussion 
Legal ecosystems-Division of Responsibility 
 It is not unreasonable for the regulations of the manufacture and use of 
marijuana to be classified into different categories. This division of responsibilities leads 
to the formation of what could be referred to as a legal ecosystem of various related and 
interdependent regulations. Laws and regulations exist and interact alongside each 
other at the local level and with relevant regulations or instructions from higher levels 
and branches of government to maintain a specific system of policies and/or political 
ideals. In my research, the legal ecosystem exists to maintain a system of drug 
prohibition. In maintaining the system of drug prohibition, the legal ecosystem tacitly 
upholds a prohibitionist ideology. “Legal ecosystem” is related to but not the same as 
“legal landscape”. In this study, “legal landscape” refers to the character of the legal 
system such as what is legal or illegal. This is distinct from “legal ecosystem” which 
refers to the internal relationships between regulations themselves regardless of the 
“legal landscape” it exists on.  
The separation of responsibilities regarding bylaws regulating marijuana grow 
operations, like the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw, and bylaws governing land 
use pertaining to medicinal cannabis production and sale—Delta Zoning Bylaw No. 
2750, 1977 forms a separate legal ecosystem. This legal ecosystem can be observed in 
two respects: a local ecosystem that is strictly intra-municipality; an overall ecosystem 
involving the interaction of the local as well as higher levels of government law (federal, 
provincial and judiciary).  
The legal ecosystem, in this case, exists to propagate and coordinate a 
prohibitionist system that is supportive of the overall War on Drugs. Local bylaws are 
the manifestation of national and international prohibitionist policies on the local 
government level and provide direct support for agencies engaged in enforcement 
efforts through their power to regulate land-use (other aspects of drug policy are the 
responsibility of higher levels of government). It could be said that local bylaws fill a 
“gap” left behind by other levels of government as they seek to regulate responsibilities 
that are mandated to them by legislation or the Constitution Act.  
The justifications and purposes behind the existence of the bylaws forming this 
legal ecosystem are discussed critically. Critiques of the purpose and functioning of the 
bylaws are centred on differences between the formal (the stated purpose in the 
regulations themselves) and the informal purposes as found in examination of relevant 
audio, print and digital documents. The effects of these bylaws are also discussed in 
relation to how they permit an economic environment that is favourable to the interests 
of industrial agriculture or agribusiness.  
Jurisdiction and responsibilities (Intra-Municipal) 
The Controlled Substance Property Bylaw (CSPB) and the Delta Zoning Bylaw 
(DZB) exist in conjunction with each other and further interact with various lower-order 
municipal bylaws that regulate and enforce other aspects of local economy where 
marijuana is present. However, there are certainly areas that more involve one of the 
two bylaws over the other. With regards to the CSPB, the focus is on illegal marijuana 
growing operations in residential areas. Meanwhile, the relevant amendments in the 
Delta Zoning Bylaw apply primarily to operations involved in the federally permitted area 
of medicinal cannabis.  
Some of the definitions in the original CSPB come from other bylaws, such as the 
definition for “occupancy permit” as referenced in the Delta Building/Plumbing Bylaw 
No. 6060, 2002 (Delta Controlled Substance Property Bylaw No. 6200, 2004, Part 1—
Introductory Provision 5, 2). Additionally, as mentioned earlier the CSPB also works 
alongside ordinances such as the Bylaw Notice Enforcement Bylaw and the Municipal 
Ticketing Information Bylaw (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2014). The bylaw 
does not exist and operate on its own. The require interaction with and the conditions 
established by other bylaws and regulations from the same municipality, specifically 
those pertaining to building codes, ticketing and inspection, to operate legally and 
effectively. Operating in an appropriate legal ecosystem is a necessity for the existence 
and continued operation of the Controlled Substance Property Bylaw. 
The use of marijuana or cannabis for medicinal purposes may be exempted, but 
are not totally uninfluenced by national marijuana prohibition. In the case of Delta, 
marijuana use is tightly controlled and is just as subject to regulations as illegal 
marijuana growing operations are. Only in this case, the city utilizes zoning regulations, 
specifically the Delta Zoning Bylaw No. 2750, 1977 Amendment (Prohibition of Medical 
Marihuana Facilities – P13-10) Bylaw No. 7313. 2014, to enforce a prohibitionist 
agenda. Like the CSPB, the Delta Zoning Bylaw operates and interacts alongside other 
municipal regulations such as the Delta Business Licence Bylaw No. 4019, 1986. 
Jurisdiction and responsibilities—Extra-Municipal 
These bylaws must follow or be consistent with statutes of higher and sovereign 
levels of government. As stated in the first line of the CSPB, the bylaw invokes for its 
definitions Schedules I, II, III, IV, V and VI of the federal Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act and acknowledges the act’s occasional amendment (Delta Controlled 
Substance Property Bylaw No. 6200, 2004, Part 1—Introductory Provisions, Definitions, 
2). Likewise, the Delta Zoning Bylaw is pursuant to Sections 903, 904, 906, 909 and 
917 of British Columbia’s Local Government Act (Delta Zoning Bylaw No. 2750, 1977, 
Part I-Title). Delta’s bylaws on narcotic substances (as well as many other unrelated 
subjects) exist as a part of a larger ecosystem of laws, statutes and judicial rulings. As 
such, municipal bylaws must interact and work within frameworks imposed by these 
higher levels of law and are subject to requirements and limitations under them. 
Perhaps the best statement of how much force a municipal government has in 
addressing wider societal issues (or phenomena that are seen as issue by some) was 
made by Delta’s Mayor Lois Jackson regarding how best to obtain the benefits of drug 
raids from the federal government: “We tend to forget at the local level that we don’t 
have any status” (Adlem, 2003). The structure of the political system and the order of 
precedence for federal and provincial levels of government and their agencies means 
that some concerns of local/municipal-level governments and agencies are either 
under-addressed or ignored.  
As an example, the Delta and the Delta Police Department, until the enactment 
of bylaws such as the CSPB, were not able to receive benefits or cost-recovery from the 
proceeds of crime despite the majority of efforts in support of federal drug law 
enforcement being carried out by municipal agencies (Adlem, Regular Meeting, 2003). 
This problem of governmental subordination is relevant to problems noted in 
scholarship in the ability of municipalities to address social issues. Not unlike the 
inability to collect on the proceeds of crime, municipalities in general are limited in their 
ability to address societal problems and have only the ability to govern through zoning 
and land-use (Ranasinghe and Valverde, 2006, 327), which precisely describe the 
bylaws being studied in this paper.   
In 2014, major amendments were proposed and enacted for Delta Zoning Bylaw 
No. 2750, 1977 that would legally prohibit medical marijuana facilities to operate within 
the jurisdiction of the city. Two amendments, 7313 and 7314, were proposed but only 
one was ultimately adopted. Bylaw No. 7313 amends the Delta Zoning Bylaw by 
prohibiting medical marijuana production facilities. This would forbid the use of land, 
buildings or structures for the growing, cultivations, drying, testing, packaging, storage, 
distribution and/or the sale of marijuana) in zones outside of the Agricultural Land 
Reserve (ALR) (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2014, 2-3).  
Bylaw No. 7314 would have made likewise prohibitions on the medical marijuana 
production on lands within the Agricultural Land Reserve—the reason they drafted a 
separate bylaw for the ALR is because Delta is subject to a Provincial Order-in-Council. 
This Order-in-Council requires the city to get the approval of the Provincial Minister of 
Agriculture to pass any bylaw that would affect businesses operating in the ALR 
(Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2014, 3). However, BC Minister of Agriculture 
Norm Letnick rejected Bylaw No. 7314 effectively allowing medical marijuana facilities to 
exist on the ALR—at least in theory. Neither the Minister nor Provincial government 
provided any guidelines or criteria for local governments (like Delta) to regulate the 
permitted medical marijuana facilities on the ALR (Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 
2014, 2).  
In the end, the amendment (referred to as 7313) to the Delta Zoning Bylaw 
banning medical marijuana facilities on city land outside of the Agricultural Land 
Reserve which amended was passed unanimously by Delta Council (Delta Municipal 
Council, Minutes, 2014, 8-9), effectively contributing to a prohibitionist regime on a local 
level. But, because of the legal ecosystem and superstructure that municipalities are a 
part of, the impact of this prohibitionist regime has been limited. This loophole, so to 
speak, left open by the provincial government allows the possibility for medicinal 
cannabis to be grown and farmed industrially in the Agricultural Land Reserve (provided 
that all the necessary regulatory procedures have been applied and followed).  
The fact that amendments to existing bylaws are themselves titled “bylaws” 
complicates research on this subject. Certainly, improved legal style formats ought to be 
adopted by cities (and perhaps other levels of government) to more specifically 
segregate/identify which pieces of regulation are amendments to statutes and which 
pieces are the true statutes in force. This would certainly contribute to ease of 
understanding of bylaws for the ordinary citizen and potentially reduce instances of 
offending by them as well as financial burdens normally created by fines (which could 
be argued as contributing to class oppression). 
The recent Federal Court case of Allard v. Canada ruled that the Marihuana for 
Medical Purposes Regulations were unconstitutional since they infringed on the 
defendants’ Section 7 Charter rights (which are those involving the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person) and was not justifiable under Section 1 of the Charter (which 
would have allowed exception only if it passed the test of being demonstrably justifiable 
in a free and democratic society; it did not pass). The MMPR was struck down for a 
period of six months by the courts to allow for the federal government to create a more 
compatible medical marijuana regime (Allard v. Canada). The ruling effectively supports 
the right of medical marijuana patients to grow their own cannabis plants in their own 
homes (Browne, 2016).  
The separation of responsibilities of bylaws pertaining to marijuana grow 
operations (covered by the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw) and other bylaws 
governing licensed narcotics facilities (such as the Delta Business Licence Bylaw No. 
4019, 1986 and, specifically, the Delta Zoning Bylaw No. 2750, 1977 Amendment 
(Prohibition of Medical Marihuana Facilities – P13-10) Bylaw No. 7313. 2014 which 
govern or rather prohibit medical marijuana dispensaries and production outside the 
Agricultural Land Reserve) may be on a collision course.  
The forthcoming legalization of recreational cannabis (and the specific rules on 
private home growing) aside, the impact of the Allard v. Canada decision may have two 
ramifications for Delta’s bylaws. The first is that the separation of responsibilities for 
these two local ordinances may not continue as it currently stands. The CSPB is 
oriented towards enforcement, prevention and reimbursing the expenses involved in 
dealing with marijuana growing operations that are illegal (with respect to federal 
narcotics control legislation) with no mention of or making irrelevant whether or not the 
grow-op is intended for medicinal purposes or recreational use. However, the fact that 
they overlap may not necessarily cause them to conflict. The second and most 
important ramification is that these two bylaws may become legally challengeable as 
their enforcement (particularly the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw) could be in 
violation of the Section 7 Charter rights of medical patients’ which translates to their 
right to grow their own supply of medicinal cannabis. Hardship arguments for patients 
residing in Delta could also be made in such a case given that the ability to acquire their 
medicinal cannabis is hampered by the city’s Zoning Bylaw—which blocks the 
establishment of dispensaries within the municipality.  
The effect it will have upon landlords in their ability to challenge the fines 
imposed by these bylaws (for legally-permissible activities conducted by their tenants) is 
not as clearly predictable. However, the right of medicinal cannabis patients to grow 
their own supply—whom are not required to inform their landlords—has already become 
a source of conflict between patient-tenants and landlords. However, it has been 
speculated that landlords may have more flexibility in enforcing prohibitionist rules with 
regards to recreational cannabis. Tenancy agreements would be modified to restrict 
non-medicinal cannabis in a manner similar to those clauses restricting pets in rental 
spaces (Woo, 2017).  
With regards to the potential ramifications of federal changes to the legal 
landscape around marijuana and its effects on prohibition-oriented bylaws, Delta’s 
bylaws are challengeable in the courts on their consistency. As mentioned earlier, 
halfway through its first term in office the Trudeau government put into motion cannabis 
legalization that was initially come into effect by the 1st of July 2018 (later changed to 
October 17th). However, not unlike what we see with alcohol, the provinces will decide 
how marijuana will be distributed, sold, the price and the minimum age of purchase. 
Ottawa’s minimum age will be 18 years but the provinces will have the discretion to set 
a higher age if they wish (which may lead to inconsistencies not unlike various drinking 
ages across the country). Furthermore, Canadians will be limited to four plants per 
household (Cochrane, 2017).  
It may become more legally difficult to fully utilize and enforce the Controlled 
Substance Property Bylaw to impose fines for the closure of marijuana grow-operations 
if the substance itself is no longer listed in the same way on the federal Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act that the CSPB obtains its definitions from. Municipal 
regulations could come into conflict with federal ones. To continue to prohibit the legal 
private possession of cannabis plants might require further changes or amendments to 
bylaws which may or may not be challengeable in court (constitutional questions would 
apply here) and possibly difficult to enforce (there could be issues with regards to civil 
liberties). What this all might entail is not fully certain. 
Justification and raison d’être 
Before addressing the informal justifications behind these bylaws, it is important 
to highlight what the bylaws themselves say are the justifications, if any, behind what 
they activities they enforce or prohibit. As mentioned earlier in the findings section the 
bylaw receives its authority from the Community Charter and makes the official, overall 
justification for its existence on the basis of that “property used for the manufacture, 
trade, use, sharing, sale or barter of controlled substances causes disturbance and 
inconvenience to the residents of neighbouring properties, creates risks to the health 
and safety of residents, and reduces the value of neighbouring properties” (Delta 
Controlled Substance Property Bylaw No. 6200, 2004, p. 1). 
There is usually a stated reasoning process or justification behind the existence 
of a law, bylaw, ordinance or other statute. However, it would not be sufficient to look 
exclusively at what is stated in the bylaw itself, it is also important to look at statements 
from outside of the bylaw. As such, informal justifications (that is, statements made 
outside of the text of the bylaw itself) were gathered regarding the bylaw. It is here that 
one can articulate potential cultural or ideological influences or perspectives in the 
process of creating this bylaw.  
 Prohibitionist/War on Drugs-style rhetoric (such as an emphasis on fear) was 
present in discussions of anti-marijuana bylaws but not to such an extent as one may 
believe. Justifications for the bylaws from informal channels were largely of a financial 
character. The objective of cost recovery and increasing municipal benefits of the 
proceeds of crime was a consistently dominant justification for the Controlled Substance 
Property Bylaw. Public safety arguments from the bylaw itself did not reflect reasoning 
processes outside of it. Indeed, former Delta Police Chief Jim Cessford was quoted as 
saying that, in the process of conducting drug enforcement operations “there are costs” 
and did not discount the importance of generating revenue to alleviate these costs 
(Delta Optimist, February 11, 2004, p. 3).  
This does not mean that the CSPB is not oriented towards a Prohibitionist 
agenda. It mere reflects a role in the War on Drugs more so in its existence rather than 
in its creation. War on Drugs-style rhetoric was more of a factor with regards to issues 
of zoning regulations. There is a particular irony because of how proposed permits 
regarding the Delta Zoning Bylaw have more to do with activity that has been legalized 
rather than such rhetoric being directed in support of bylaws such as the CSPB. 
Prohibitionist rhetoric came into play in debates that were unexpected but, overall, 
reasonable—cannabis, even in a legally authorized, medicinal form is a stigmatized 
subject. 
 The Controlled Substance Property Bylaw can be considered to be a localized 
tool acting in concert with the greater War on Drugs in two major ways. This first is that 
it acts as a prevention/deterrence measure that seeks to thwart unsanctioned narcotics 
manufacturing from becoming established on properties known to be attractive sites for 
controlled drug production. This also includes providing information to landlords to 
assist them in becoming compliant with the city’s bylaws. Examination of this 
perspective also evokes the problematic, class-based aspects characteristic of the War 
on Drugs.  
Overall, the areas of economy that involve the enforcement of the Controlled 
Substance Property Bylaw are strictly aimed at illegal, residence-based marijuana 
production activities. Delta’s January 12, 2004 report makes references to studies 
highlighting that a majority of marijuana growing operations are located on rental 
properties (Corporation of Delta, 2004, 3). The problem with this specific focus is that it 
possibly ignores grow-ops that take place in non-rental properties such as larger, high-
income homes (the owners whom potentially can afford to mask their activities more 
effectively and would be under less suspicion).  Most notably, commercial or industrial 
properties such as privately-owned warehouses and farms which are more affordable to 
a wealthier class of citizen. The impact of this focus would be temporary as narcotics 
producers would simply adapt their methods of establishing and operating growing 
operations.  
Likewise, the landlord guidelines and advice (the financial costs of bylaw 
penalties would be the burden of the landlords) that were included as attachments to 
the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw could be seen as affecting only certain 
classes of landlord and tenant. The advice to landlords encourages them to be 
suspicious of tenants identifies certain characteristics associated with marijuana 
growing operations. Some signs involve material evidence such as certain “skunk” 
smells, the sounds of motors or machinery, discarded gardening debris among others. 
Other warning signs involve tenant behaviours such as having few furniture and visitors 
at unusual hours (Delta Controlled Substance Property Bylaw No. 6200, 2004, 
Attachment B).  
As reasonable as some of these warning signs are, they could easily be 
indicators of innocent, legal activities such as gardening or using motorized appliances 
such as laundry machines. Smells could very well be attributable to the presence of 
pest animals such as skunks and the presence of debris on a property could certainly 
be attributable to having an untidy tenant (which is inconsiderate but not necessarily 
unlawful). Additionally, tenants may not necessarily have much furniture because they 
be economically disadvantaged and have few possessions. Furthermore, having a 
home that does not appear “lived in” or having occasional “visitors” at “unusual hours” 
may be indicative that tenants may have employment that keeps them away from home 
and have them work and transit home at a time of day that the landlord, in contrast, 
does not need to. Indeed, these “visitors” that the guidelines describe may very well be 
the tenants themselves returning from work.  
Furthermore, the financial penalties of the CSPB do not account for differences in 
class with respect to landlords and occupants themselves. The bylaw states that fines 
liable do not exceed $5000 per day of continued offense (Delta Controlled Substance 
Property Bylaw No. 6200, 2004, 6). This flat-rate amount does not account for the fact 
that some landowners may be more able to pay the cost than others and a limit of 
$5000 may not be a deterrent for some. It would be more prudent for a bylaw to include 
provisions for fines to be adjusted according to the income-level of the offender similar 
to the idea of progressive taxation. This concept of “progressive punishment” is not 
unprecedented, various jurisdictions in Continental and Nordic Europe utilize income 
information when issuing financial penalties. Finland, for example, uses this method 
when issuing speeding tickets to motorists (Arnett, 2015). 
 This type of bylaw also provides for direct financial support for government 
operations that are participating in War on Drugs efforts. The difference here is that it 
financially supports or reinforces—that is, to strengthen or replenish—local or municipal 
agencies that conduct activities consistent with national or transnational narcotics 
prohibition. As mentioned previously, the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw is 
intended to recover financial costs associated with counter-narcotics operations and 
distributing the benefits to municipal police and other city agencies engaged in drug 
control enforcement. What bylaws such as these effectively do is provide financial 
incentives to the continuance of the War on Drugs and, indeed, extend the War and 
provide tools for the fighting on the local/municipal level.  
 There can be little doubt as to the presence of an ideological justification, 
specifically on that is prohibitionist/War on Drugs-oriented, with regards to the local level 
regulation of marijuana activities. Indeed, there is a veiled difference in justification of 
these ordinances officially versus what is said unofficially. It is not exactly certain how 
this bylaw regime will change with regards to coming legalization but it is possible to 
make some predictions on how it might proceed in the rapidly-changing future. 
As mentioned earlier, there is the possibility of conflicts between laws as 
municipal regulations involving cannabis. Citizens, defendants and other potential 
litigants could bring legal challenges to Delta and various other local or municipal 
governments with bylaws or regulations that prohibit land-use activities that relate to 
recreational or medicinal cannabis. Whether or not these cases are successful in the 
courts remains to be seen. Additionally, the introduction of legalized recreational 
cannabis may cause further overlaps in bylaw jurisdictions and perhaps further 
amendments to accommodate definitions that would include cannabis use 
recreationally.  
This assumes, of course, that opposition to prohibitionist policies do not arise in 
local electoral politics. Intra-municipal movements that challenge remnant prohibitionist 
regimes are neither unheard of nor are they non-contemporary. Two referendums on 
remaining local prohibitionist policies (both in place for more than 100 years) on alcohol 
were held in two dry towns Saskatchewan and Alberta in 2013 and 2014 respectively. 
The residents of the originally Mennonite town of Hepburn, Saskatchewan voted in 
favour of permitting liquor to be sold at the Co-op grocery store (Canadian Press, 2013). 
A year later, residents of the predominantly Mormon town of Cardston, Alberta rejected 
permitting alcohol sales in their town (Graveland, 2014). The overwhelming popularity 
and support that legalized cannabis has in British Columbia (75 percent according just 
to a Nanos poll conducted in 2016; the highest level of support in Canada) (Leblanc, 
2016) makes it likely that attempts to continue prohibitionist policies at the local level of 
government may face resistance from many residents and potentially affect local 
political campaigns in the future.  
Another likely outcome of this changing legal landscape is the increasing trend of 
major pharmaceutical retail chains getting involved in the sale, distribution and 
production of cannabis. Even with regards to just medicinal cannabis, the 
pharmaceutical chain Shoppers Drug Mart—which is Canada’s largest chain of retail 
pharmacies and has a large outlet in South Delta—in late 2016 formally applied to 
Health Canada to become a licensed distributor and dispenser of medicinal cannabis. 
Reminiscent of the definitions found in the Delta Zoning Bylaw, the Health Canada 
license is called a “producer license”. Despite this name, Shoppers Drug Mart’s 
spokesperson clarified that they had no intention of actually producing (growing, 
creating, etc.) medicinal cannabis itself (Evans, 2016). It is not unforeseeable that other 
pharmacy chains will capitalize on this potential market for medicinal cannabis. What 
remains to be seen is whether or not pharmacies will opt for the ability to sell 
recreational cannabis as well. Likewise, it is not certain how or if municipalities like 
Delta, Surrey, Vancouver, New Westminster or others will respond or challenge 
established pharmaceutical corporations in the same way that they have challenged 
smaller-scale marijuana dispensaries.  
 A final possibility that is, rather, obvious is that although the legal landscape 
relevant to cannabis is changing, the legal landscape around other controlled or 
outlawed substances has not. It would still be possible for enforcement of the Controlled 
Substances Property Bylaw to be carried out in relation to illegal production of other 
narcotic substances. Indeed, methamphetamine labs were also mentioned at the time of 
the original creation of the CSPB (Delta Optimist, February 11, 2004, p. 3) and it is not 
unlikely that clandestine laboratories or storage centres for other substances 
(particularly opioids) could still be affected by this type of bylaw. Furthermore, the term 
“grow-op” is still applicable to other plants and flora grown for illegal drug markets: 
opium poppy growing operations were dismantled by RCMP in British Columbia’s 
Fraser Valley (TheStar.com, 2010).  
There are certainly differences between the officially stated justifications in 
bylaws such as the CSPB versus what is publicly stated by municipal officials. The 
bylaw as more of an expense-recovery tool (rather than a public safety one) does not 
discount its overall usefulness as a localized tool in the War on Drugs. However, the 
CSPB is seriously flawed in that its enforcement criteria of potential offenders and 
punishment schemes ignores factors of class (focusing exclusively on lower-value 
properties and non-reflexive fines) and stigmatizes activities that may not necessarily 
indicate illegal activity. The bylaw is also a potentially vulnerable tool in that it may 
operate in conflict with overall changes in the legal landscape on drugs. Certainly the 
justifications behind a bylaw like the CSPB cannot be fully explained or evaluated 
simply by looking only at the bylaw’s text. 
Favourable to Agribusiness 
It can hardly be refuted that a system has emerged as a result of the bylaws that 
Delta has enacted that is economically-biased in favour of certain sectors. The way the 
legal ecosystem operates and has operated in Delta appears to be preferential to the 
interests of large cannabis-centred agribusiness and industrial farming—by means of 
prohibiting land-use suitable for their competition (that is, small scale retail and 
production outside of industrial/agricultural lands and residences).  
For instance, in 2016, municipal staff recommended amendments to the 
Business Licence Bylaw that would require business licensing for marijuana 
dispensaries even if they “claim to operate” (clearly prejudicial language) on a charitable 
basis must have a business licence to operate. Likewise, the language used in these 
amendment definitions exclude marijuana dispensaries from definitions including: drug 
stores, pharmacies, polyclinics and, most notably, methadone dispensaries (among 
others). Furthermore, there are increasing financial penalties that can be applied with 
bylaw infraction tickets and further powers to deny or revoke licenses to applicants 
(Corporation of Delta, Council Report, 2016, 2-4).  
This explicit distinction between merits of medicinal cannabis and medicinal 
methadone dismisses the stringent government regulations already in place, the 
growing scientific evidence of its pharmacological properties and the learned-judgement 
and legitimacy of the doctors whom prescribe the drug. Additionally, the tendency to 
respond by means of increasing penalties is reflective of a rather traditionalist thought-
process of punishment.  
Despite the upcoming changes in marijuana legality, the Trudeau government 
has nevertheless launched nationwide police raids against marijuana dispensaries and 
have arrested long-time activists Marc and Jodie Emery (Cochrane, 2017). Jodie Emery 
(just over a week before Trudeau’s legalization plans were announced) made the claim 
that the Liberals were planning for a monopolized marijuana market that excluded 
smaller dispensaries in favour of larger producers (possibly agribusiness) (Nuttall, 
2017). It is not unthinkable that regulatory changes on the federal level might legitimize 
or encourage municipal bylaws that reproduce conditions favorable to large 
agribusiness or work in favor of large firms already established thanks to previous 
bylaws. However, there is the possibility that challenges to these bylaws may be 
pursued by these corporations seeking to capitalize on the newly-legalized recreational 
market (so far, only medicinal cannabis is open to production on Delta’s Agricultural 
Land Reserve). As mentioned earlier, major pharmaceutical chains are already making 
preparations for making medicinal cannabis available for purchase in their stores. 
Nevertheless, the municipal regulatory environment that exists as of the writing of 
this paper is more permissive to large industrial concerns. With the use of specific 
definitions in the bylaws, the prohibition of cannabis production—which also includes 
the retail sale and distribution of cannabis—on lands outside of the ALR create a 
political-economic environment amenable to large agribusiness. Relevant to this are 
Mayor Lois Jackson’s concerns about industrial-scale cannabis production on 
agricultural land as potentially displacing food production (Browne, 2016). These are 
crucial and legitimate concerns given the trend of a decreasing amount of agricultural 
land in the rapidly urbanized development of British Columbia.  
Only those companies that can afford the stringent regulations and financial 
costs of establishing operations in the permitted industrial zones can operate (effectively 
denying access to this market from smaller start-ups, non-profits, co-operative ventures 
or other pétit bourgeois business). This can produce the foundations for private-sector 
monopolies not unlike what can be seen with traditional pharmaceuticals or some of the 
larger liquor businesses. What these sorts of amendments and amendment proposals 
amount to is a preference towards commercial ventures (that is, corporate and profit-
driven) in growing medical marijuana.  
The activities that are part of the legal ecosystem in Delta make an imperfect 
contribution to Canada’s national marijuana regulation landscape in how it provides 
financial support for enforcement operations. The city’s bylaws work in coordination with 
each other as well as with legislation from superior levels of government. However, 
parts of the structure of this ecosystem inhibits its ability to support a prohibitionist 
system in full. At times, regulations and decisions by higher levels of government 
actually work against Delta’s efforts. The bylaws and their methods of enforcement are 
also partially flawed in their ability to fully enforce prohibition—in particular, they neglect 
certain socio-economic qualities that would have been prudent to consider in the 
bylaw’s drafting. Furthermore, these prohibitionist bylaws have a further (arguably 
contradictory) effect on Delta’s economic environment as they appear to be favourable 
to large industrial agribusiness of medicinal cannabis production whilst, at the same 
time, creating an environment hostile to smaller commercial-retail enterprises that 
provide cannabis to their users. This legal ecosystem is also subject to serious 
complications given the changing legal landscape of marijuana on the federal level. Not 
unlike the threat to Delta due to coming changes in sea levels, the legal ecosystem in 
Delta is threatened by coming changes in the federal legal landscape on marijuana.  
The legal ecosystem in Delta indeed serves a role in support of the overall War 
on Drugs and the prohibition of marijuana but one that is limited and containing various 
contradictions. Without the appropriate adaptation, the Delta’s bylaws regulating 
marijuana may be unable to function properly in this role. Likewise, without the 
appropriate adaptation or even repeal, Delta’s bylaws risk being inconsistent with 
Canada’s legal landscape on marijuana and totally out of touch with the standards of its 
citizens. 
Conclusion 
This study was meant to be a critical exploration of the current reality of 
municipalities and their regulation and suppression of narcotics. This is especially 
important in the context of cannabis legalization on the provincial and national-levels of 
government and how both existing and prior municipal bylaws (that limit cannabis’ 
availability) continue to impact the effectiveness of legalization—creating situations for 
many people where cannabis is still de facto illegal and may not necessarily discourage 
illegal market sources.  
The study included examining the development, application and overall 
objectives of municipal bylaws, specifically those involved in the regulation of controlled, 
narcotic substances such as cannabis/marijuana (both medicinal and non-medicinal). 
Delta, my hometown and site of multiple cannabis-related bylaw activities, was selected 
as the municipality for this study and attention was given to any latent or implicit 
ideological justifications for the need and use of two particular bylaws (one addressing 
land-use for illegal purposes and another addressing land-use for, otherwise legal, 
commercial purposes). There was also a focus on any economic or class-based effects 
that these bylaws would have when enforced.  
In hindsight, it might have been a better choice to focus solely on developments 
relevant to the Delta Zoning Bylaw. The reason for this is because of how more relevant 
and contemporary the subject of medicinal cannabis (and, in future, non-medicinal) is in 
the public’s zeitgeist. Discussion of marijuana “grow-ops” might be considered by the 
public as a subject that is now passé. Moreover, there is more available data to be 
collected on the subject and debates over the Delta Zoning Bylaw regarding medicinal 
cannabis. Documents on this subject (aside from being contemporary) also contain 
more examples of public input—specifically attached emails from constituents and 
others. The increase in the use of electronic communications and of online news media 
could be a factor in the differing amount of data available between the early-2000s 
(when “grow-ops” were a more common topic of discussion) versus the early-2010s 
(when one is more likely to hear about “dispensaries” and “medicinal marijuana”). But 
more research is needed to settle this conclusively. Despite this, my research does 
cover both of these two bylaws and the areas of responsibility that they are involved in.  
The findings demonstrated some aspects of a War on Drugs- or prohibitionist-
oriented ideology, but it seems that the motivations for the enactment and enforcement 
of these bylaws were largely financial (as a means to recover budgetary expenditures 
for drug enforcement operations). Nevertheless, the very fact that a bylaw recovers 
costs of enforcement categorizes it as providing financial support for the 
prohibitionist/War on Drugs system that has led to numerous oppressive and 
problematic outcomes for both Canadian and international society. These were not the 
only findings. Themes that could be classified as being “cultural” were discovered in the 
process. Such themes included how seriously officials appeared to treat the matter of 
drug grow-ops/property seizures, relations/tensions between regions and governments 
and the reaction that officials and members of the public had to controversial rezoning 
application (they would have produced commercial cannabis). It might be worthwhile for 
future research to explore these themes for subject matter other than marijuana growing 
operations. 
I also discussed how municipal bylaws form a part of a legal ecosystem based 
upon the interactions between other bylaws and the statutes and/or rulings of higher 
levels of government. The overall role that prohibitionist ideals played in the existence of 
relevant bylaws were discussed as well as some (class-based) criticisms in their 
inherent structure. Indeed, the legal ecosystem occasionally works against efforts in 
support of a War on Drugs ideology. The legal ecosystem at the same time plays a role 
in class conflict in that bylaws are developed and enforced in a manner that almost 
exclusively targets and punishes residents and owners of lower-income rental housing 
(its criteria does not affect higher-income residences or commercial properties whose 
owners are more likely to afford means of averting suspicion). Likewise, the punishment 
framework of municipal bylaws does not account for the income of owners. The fine is 
not adjusted to the income-level of the offender. Thus more affluent offenders may not 
be deterred by the bylaw. Critical economic considerations were discussed in how these 
bylaws created an environment that is favorable to the interests of large, industrial 
agribusiness and against smaller, retail enterprises. Furthermore, predictions were 
made as to the future of these bylaws given the changing legal landscape that these 
mostly prohibitionist bylaws must be able to adapt to.  
It will take time to be certain of the future or extinction of marijuana prohibition, its 
current form is by no means static. This research demonstrates that municipal bylaws 
as a form of power (and drug regulation) are imperfect. They are in their nature 
complicated mechanisms that can be hampered or impaired in their effectiveness as 
often as they can effect progressive change (progressive change which at times may 
not necessarily be intended). Furthermore, bylaws can have consequences (intended or 
otherwise) that create imbalances of power that stifle fair economic competition as well 
as create additional oppressive conditions for socio-economically marginalized classes 
of people. Future research in drug-related municipal bylaws in a suburban setting will 
need to take into account the complex nature of bylaws as well as how adequately a 
municipality maintains and organizes its records. It might be the case that useful data 
may not exist, is incomplete, lost or inaccessible for a variety of reasons—the less 
significant the municipality or town is, the more these problems are likely to occur. In 
addition, it may be necessary to look beyond the scale and hierarchy of governments 
(such as examining bylaws from a cultural, social ecology or other perspectives). 
It is clear that municipal bylaws will continue to play a role in the regulation of 
marijuana. However, the degree to which it will be able to impose some sort of moral or 
social control is likely to become impaired if not increasingly opposed as society’s 
attitudes on the drug continue to change. In the meantime, cities and towns might be 
well-advised to investigate potential municipalisation (socialized/public ownership; a 
“localized” Crown corporation or utility, if you will) of a legalised cannabis industry. In 
this way, citizens might more directly benefit from public ownership than would 
necessarily be possible if assets were simply controlled federally or provincially (the 
nation-state). This is not necessarily a call for the radical visions of municipal control 
such as those of the late Murray Bookchin, but there are certainly a variety of ideas 
available to municipalities to approach such a potentially profitable resource such as 
cannabis. 
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